



2023 GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES

JOINT ANALYSIS FOR BETTER DECISIONS

MID-YEAR UPDATE

Acknowledgements

The Global Report on Food Crises is the output of a remarkable partnership between 16 organizations that together collect, analyse and interpret available data to report on vulnerable populations facing acute food insecurity around the world. We are thankful to the governments, international agencies, non-government organizations and institutions that each year contribute to the production of the GRFC, including this GRFC 2023 Mid-Year Update.

The Food Security Information Network Secretariat is particularly thankful to the individuals with whom we collaborate to develop this product. They provide the data and review the report's content using their specific expertise, which is what makes this report so valuable. Thank you also to the vulnerable individuals, families and communities who share their experience of hunger and enable us to communicate it through this document. It is for them that we produce the report.

It is difficult to list all the names of people who contribute to the report and the list on the right is by no means comprehensive.

Thank you to the European Union without whose funding this report would not be possible.

FSIN Secretariat

Federica Carfagna, Evan Carr, Lynn Clark, Carlos Manuel Estevez Reyes, Giulio Fabris, Maria Paola Guerra, Sara McHattie, Paul Neuman, Emily Olsson and Katy Williams.

Technical support from GRFC partner organizations

Lavinia Antonaci, Immaculate Atieno, Helene Berton, Rogerio Bonifacio, Eric Branckaert, Ennie Shonhiwa Chikwanha, Sophie Chotard, Cristina Coslet, Alessandro Costantino, Anne Celine Delinger, Nana Dlamini, Anteneh Dobamo, Irene Ferrari, Abdi Fidar, Gwenaelle Garnier, Valerie Gatchell, Nick Goetschalckx, Shannon Hayes, Nikki Alexandra Herwanger, Arif Husain, Baoua Issoufou, Sally James, Douglas Jayasekaran, Damien Joud, Kudzayi Kariri, Janet Kimani, Brenda Lazarus, José Lopez, Oliver Maes, Hamadoun Mahlamoudou, Abdul Majid, Williams Massaoud, Aurélien Mellin, Quraishia Merzouk, Naser Mohmand, Siphokazi Moloinyane, Cinzia Monetta, Giampiero Muci, Charity Mumbua, Anuradha Narayan, Mary Njenga, Theuri Terry Njeri, Adamou Ousmane, Cinzia Papavero, Elise Polak, Benedetta Pompili, Jonathan Pound, Melanie Rabier, Hasina Rakotomanana, Felix Rembold, Brendan Rice, Javier Rodriguez Corrales, José Ruiz Espí, Mohamed Salem, Duncan Samikwa, Edgar Scrase, Almudena Serrano, Ricardo Sibrián, JungEun Sohn, Christine Strassmaier, Ahmed Sulaiman, Felicia Takavarasha, Gaolathe Thobokwe, Philippe Thomas, Laura Tosi, Monika Tothova, Jose Manuel Veiga Lopez-Pena, Roosmarijn Verstraeten, Joseluis Vivero, Rob Vos, Anne Wagner, Lisamarie Zammit, Mario Zappacosta and Hein Zeelie.



Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations



FOOD SECURITY CLUSTER



Global NUTRITION CLUSTER



SICA Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana



Required citation

FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises. 2023.
GRFC 2023 Mid-Year Update. Rome.

All rights reserved. Reproduction and dissemination of material in this information product for educational or other non-commercial uses are authorized without any prior written permission from the copyright holders provided the source is fully acknowledged.

Reproduction of material in this information product for resale or other commercial purposes is prohibited without written permission.

Applications for such permission should be addressed to the Food Security Information Network Secretariat,
email: fsin-secretariat@wfp.org

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food Security Information Network (FSIN), its constituent parties and its partners concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

©FSIN 2023

Contents

Acronyms	4
Key findings	5
Introduction.....	6
CHAPTER 1 A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD CRISES.....	8
Acute food insecurity overview, mid-2023	9
Spotlight Lower international food prices have not eased economic pressures at macro and household levels	16
Spotlight El Niño returns amid multiple global crises.....	18
CHAPTER 2 REGIONAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD CRISES IN 2023	20
Central and Southern Africa	21
East Africa	23
Focus Conflict in the Sudan	26
West Africa and the Sahel	28
Asia	30
Latin America and the Caribbean	32
Middle East and North Africa	34
APPENDICES	36
Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2021–2023.....	37
Appendix 2 Country selection criteria and coverage for the GRFC 2023	42
TECHNICAL NOTES	44
BIBLIOGRAPHY	57

Acronyms

ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project	ITA	Interim Taliban Authority
ASAL	Arid and semi-arid lands	IOM	International Organization for Migration
BSGI	Black Sea Grain Initiative	IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
CARI	Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security	IPC AMN	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Acute Malnutrition
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	IPC FRC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Famine Review Committee
CH	Cadre Harmonisé	MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control (Comité permanent inter-État de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel)	MUAC	Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
COVID-19	Corona virus disease 2019	NDMA	National Disaster Management Agency (Kenya)
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix	NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
FAO-GIEWS	FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture	PBW	Pregnant and breastfeeding women
FCT	Federal Capital Territory	RPCA	Food Crisis Prevention Network (Réseau de Prévention des Crises Alimentaires)
FDMN	Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals	SADC	Southern African Development Community
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network	SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
FSIN	Food Security Information Network	SNNPR	Ethiopian Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit	SOFI	The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World
FSNWG	Food Security and Nutrition Working Group	TWG	Technical Working Group
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition	UN	United Nations
GEOGLAM	Group on Earth Observations Global Agricultural Monitoring Initiative	UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
GFSC	Global Food Security Cluster	UNCT	United Nations Country Team
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises	UNDRR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
GNC	Global Nutrition Cluster	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview	USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan	WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
IDP	Internally Displaced Person	WB	World Bank
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute	WFP	World Food Programme
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (in Eastern Africa)	WHZ	Weight-for-height Z-score
IMF	International Monetary Fund		

Key findings

High levels of acute food insecurity persist in 2023 due to protracted food crises and new shocks – but there are improvements in some countries.



This Mid-Year Update only includes **48 of the 73 GRFC 2023 food-crisis countries/territories** with analyses covering 2023 that were available by early August.



At 21 percent, **the share** of the total analysed population in need of urgent food assistance in the 48 countries is **largely unchanged** (from 22 percent in 2022).



In these 48 countries, **21.6 million more people** face high levels of acute food insecurity than in 2022 (a 10 percent increase), bringing the number to 238 million. The increase is due both to a 16 percent **expansion in analysis coverage** among vulnerable populations in a few countries including Bangladesh, Angola, Ghana, Pakistan and Nigeria, and persistent or intensifying **conflict/insecurity, weather extremes** and **economic shocks**.



Conditions have worsened in nine countries since 2022, including the **Sudan** with an additional 8.6 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, and **Somalia** and **Burundi** with around 1 million more each. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and the Sudan have the largest numbers of people, while South Sudan, Yemen and Haiti have the largest share. More than half of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon are facing these high levels.

The **15 countries with improvements** include Sri Lanka, the Niger and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but recent developments in the Niger may reverse this.



In 36 out of 39 countries with IPC/CH analyses, around **33.6 million people face Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4)**, with almost half of them in the Sudan, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.



In 39 countries with IPC/CH analyses, around 285 million people face Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) in 2023. Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi have the highest shares of their populations in this phase.



In 2023, **27.2 million children under 5 years are affected by wasting** in 21 food-crisis countries with data, of whom nearly **7.2 million are severely wasted**.

An estimated **6.3 million pregnant and breastfeeding women** are affected by acute malnutrition in 15 food-crisis countries with data. Significant increases in numbers of wasted children are estimated in Kenya, Mauritania and the Sudan.



The overall **number of people** facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 **will likely increase as new data become available** for GRFC countries/territories that do not yet have 2023 data, and **if drivers intensify**.



Data gaps remain a concern. No data are available for 25 countries/territories, **ten of which had data in 2022 accounting for 41 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity.** They include some of the largest food crises, such as Myanmar, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine.

In four countries a total of 128 000 people face Catastrophe in 2023



At 128 000, the **number of people in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5)** in Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan is lower than in 2022 when 376 000 people were in this phase in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Haiti, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. This is mainly explained by improvements in some contexts (e.g. drought in East Africa mitigated by improved rainfall) and by the

scale-up of humanitarian assistance to populations most in need. In **Burkina Faso**, 42 700 people face CH Phase 5, the highest in the history of the CH, and **Mali** has populations projected in this phase for the first time (2 500 people). In **Somalia**, 40 400 people face IPC Phase 5, 80 percent fewer than in 2022, and no areas are at Risk of Famine. In **South Sudan** the number projected to be in IPC Phase 5 has halved to 43 000.

Regional overviews

In **Central and Southern Africa**, up to 46.7 million people (19 percent of the analysed population) face IPC Phase 3 or above in 12 countries, a decrease since 2022 largely due to improved food availability.

East Africa faces further deterioration with up to 65.2 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (23 percent of the analysed population) in eight countries. This is driven by conflict in the Sudan and the persisting impact of the drought in the Horn of Africa.

In **West Africa**, around 44.1 million people face high levels of acute food insecurity (11 percent of the analysed population) in 15 countries. A good agricultural season mitigated the impacts of economic shocks and conflict. Political instability following the coup d'état in the Niger could affect livelihoods and food security and impact the wider region.

Asia counts an estimated 47.5 million people (34 percent of the analysed population) in high levels of acute food insecurity in four countries. Numbers reduced in Sri Lanka, and there was an increase in analysed populations in Bangladesh and Pakistan.

In **Latin America and the Caribbean** up to 13.6 million people (22 percent of the analysed population) face high levels of acute food insecurity in six countries. Numbers

decreased in Guatemala and Honduras, and increased in Haiti.

In the **Middle East and North Africa** region, up to 20.7 million (54 percent of the analysed population) face high levels of acute food insecurity in three countries. This is due to the high vulnerability of Syrian refugees in Jordan, refugees and residents in Lebanon, and populations in Yemen.

Drivers in 2023



Conflict/insecurity The war in Ukraine still causes uncertainty in global food markets. War in the Sudan continues to devastate the country and drive high levels of displacement regionally. Protracted insecurity and conflict continue to drive acute food insecurity across many food-crisis countries.



Economic shocks Decreasing global food prices are not transmitting to countries where prices remain high. Continued high public debt limits government options to import food and mitigate the effects of high prices.



Weather extremes Many countries are facing prolonged recovery from drought or flooding. There is a high probability of a moderately strong El Niño event, driving weather extremes and peaking in early 2024.

Introduction

This GRFC 2023 Mid-Year Update provides a global overview of food crises for the current year based on data available by 2 August 2023.

The GRFC 2023, published in May 2023, provided the estimate of the peak number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, or equivalent) in 58 countries/territories with data (out of 73 identified as food crises) for 2022. It provided estimates and projections for 2023 for 38 of them where data were available.


Between the publication of the GRFC 2023 and early August 2023, new analyses and projection updates became available, bringing the total number of food-crisis countries with data for the year 2023 to 48.

Using the available data from the new 2023 analyses as well as the 2023 projection data from analyses conducted in 2022 where necessary, this report provides the latest peak figures for acutely food-insecure populations in 2023.





No data for 2023 are available for 25 of the 73 GRFC 2023 food-crisis countries/territories, including three of the largest food crises of 2022 – Myanmar, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine.

Of the 48 countries with available data for 2023, 37 are defined as major food crises according to the GRFC criteria. See appendix 2.

The GRFC 2023 identified 73 food-crisis countries/territories



The GRFC foundation: evidence-based public good

-  A strong partnership
-  A highly consultative process
-  A compilation of multiple consensus-based food security and nutrition analyses
-  A technical document of reference on food crises

Further analyses are anticipated for additional countries through to the end of 2023, including for Myanmar, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine, and peak estimates may also increase for countries reported on here.

What is a food crisis?

Food crises are situations where acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition rise or are sustained at local or national levels, exceeding the local resources and capacities to respond, and raising the need for emergency and external food assistance. They are more likely among populations already suffering from prolonged food insecurity and malnutrition, and in areas where structural factors increase their vulnerability to shocks. They can also occur in countries that have important economic activities and are major food exporters, such as Ukraine. The capacity of governments to respond can influence the magnitude and severity of food crises in a country. They can be temporary or protracted, and when they are repeated and/or sustained they can provoke chronic food insecurity (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO, July 2023).

The GRFC processes aim to identify food crises based on the interaction of shocks experienced in the previous year that affect one or more of the four pillars of food security: food availability, access, utilization and stability. It focuses on countries/territories where there is evidence that the magnitude and/or severity of acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition exceeds the local resources and capacities needed to respond effectively,

IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

Phase	Phase description and priority response objectives
Phase 1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income. Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction.
Phase 2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies. Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.
Phase 3 Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or • are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies. URGENT ACTION required to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
Phase 4 Emergency	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or • are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. URGENT ACTION required to save lives and livelihoods.
Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident (for Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)* URGENT ACTION required to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

* A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC Phase 5 thresholds. If there are insufficient data for Famine classification but the available information indicates that Famine is likely occurring or will occur, then the Famine classification is called 'Famine Likely'. It is important to note that Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe.

leading to a request for the urgent mobilization of the international community.


Methodology

The GRFC relies primarily on data from Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and Cadre Harmonisé (CH) analyses. It presents populations in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) who face high levels of acute food insecurity and need urgent humanitarian assistance to reduce food consumption gaps, and to protect and save livelihoods and lives. This report also provides

data on acutely food-insecure populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) who require livelihood, disaster risk reduction and/or social protection assistance. When an IPC/CH analysis is not available, the GRFC Technical Working Groups evaluate the use of other sources of evidence. This Mid-Year Update uses FEWS NET analyses, which are IPC-compatible, and WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators (CARI), which uses household-level analysis to report moderate and severe levels of acute food insecurity, which are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above.

MAP 1.1

Mid-Year Update: Availability of data in 73 GRFC 2023 countries/territories, by early August 2023



■ Data available
 ■ No data (data gap, data not meeting GRFC partners consensus, population not analysed)
 ■ Country not selected for analysis
 ○ Indicates migrants/refugee populations (colour coding as this key)

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

See Appendix 2 for country selection criteria and coverage for the GRFC 2023.

Source: FSIN, GRFC Mid-Year Update 2023.



CHAPTER 1

A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD CRISES


Acute food insecurity overview, mid-2023

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PEAK 2023

48 of the 73 GRFC 2023 food-crisis countries/territories have 2023 data by early August.

238M people – 21% of the analysed population – in 48 countries face high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023

187.5M of them are in 39 countries with IPC/CH analyses



* This does not include 19 200 people facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outside the 2023 peak period (March–June 2023) of acute food insecurity in Haiti.

Up to 46M of them are in seven countries with FEWS NET analyses*

*No data disaggregated by phase are available for these countries.

4.4M of them are in two countries with WFP CARI analyses*

*No data disaggregated by phase are available for these countries.

285M people are in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) in 39 countries with IPC/CH analyses

Source: IPC TWGs, CH, FEWS NET, WFP CARI, 2022 and 2023.

Based on data available as of early August, around 238 million people face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent) in 48 countries in 2023.

In the 39 countries with IPC/CH analyses, 33.64 million people face Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) conditions in 36 countries and 128 600 people Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) conditions in four countries.


This report provides a partial update of acute food insecurity numbers by early August 2023. Due to a lack of updated data, the numbers do not include estimates for ten countries where 41 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2022 (including three of the largest food crises of 2022 – Myanmar, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine). The 2023 numbers are likely to increase as new analyses become available.

When comparing data from the 48 countries included in both the GRFC 2023 and the GRFC 2023 Mid-Year Update, the number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent has increased by around 10 percent, from 216.25 million in 2022. This is due both to expanding analysis coverage among already vulnerable populations and persistent or intensifying drivers.

Overall, in these 48 countries, the proportion of the analysed population facing high levels of acute food

FIGURE 1.1

Overall changes in 48 food-crisis countries between 2022 and 2023



Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023; CH, 2023; FEWS NET, 2023.



© WFP/ELOE MABAHONDJUM

The magnitude of acute food insecurity in the Sudan has increased sharply since the start of clashes in April 2023.

insecurity marginally declined from 22 percent in 2022 to 21 percent in 2023.

Expanded analysis coverage in 2023

Overall, the analysed population increased by 16 percent since 2022 with major increases concentrated in a few countries such as Bangladesh (+2 254 percent), Angola (+1 100 percent), Ghana (+139 percent) and Pakistan (+85 percent). In Nigeria, a 22 percent increase in the analysed population translates to 35 million additional people being analysed.

Shocks drive up acute food insecurity in some countries, notably in the Sudan

Nine countries with comparable analysis coverage are facing an increase in the number and share of the population facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent, driven by shocks such as the war in the Sudan, high food inflation and extreme weather events.

Among the countries with either no or minimal differences in the population analysed between 2022 and 2023, the Sudan stands out as having the biggest

increase in the prevalence of people in IPC Phase 3 or above, rising from 24 percent to 42 percent. The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased by 74 percent to reach 20.3 million, including 6.3 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Burundi, Djibouti, the Gambia, Haiti, Lebanon (residents and refugees), Liberia, Senegal and Somalia are also experiencing significant year-on-year deteriorations.

Conversely, improvements are notable across 15 countries, particularly in Namibia, where the share of the analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity decreased from 30 percent to 15 percent, and in Sri Lanka, where it declined from 28 percent to 17 percent. See maps 1.2 and 1.3.

Conflict remains the main driver

The drivers of food crises are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. Acute food insecurity is rarely driven by a single shock or hazard, but rather by the interaction between shocks – single or cumulative – and underlying poverty, structural weaknesses and other vulnerability factors. While economic shocks are significantly affecting

the vast majority of food-crisis countries, conflict remains the main driver for most people experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity. Weather extremes continue to be a significant driver in a number of countries.

Acute food insecurity by IPC/CH phase by early August 2023


This section provides more detailed analysis of the most severe phases of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4 and 5) as well as an overview of populations in IPC/CH Phase 2. Nine countries with nearly 50 million highly acutely food-insecure people do not have IPC/CH analyses and therefore a breakdown by phase is not available.

Populations in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5): 0.13 million people in four countries

Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) is the most severe phase of acute food insecurity. People face an extreme lack of food and are unable to meet other basic needs even with emergency coping strategies. The phase is marked

FIGURE 1.2

Number of people facing IPC/CH Phase 5 in four countries



* These are based on projected analyses. Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023; CH, 2022 and 2023.

by starvation, critical levels of acute malnutrition, high levels of excess mortality and collapse of livelihoods. Many deaths occur even before IPC/CH Phase 5 is reached, such that at this phase any humanitarian response is already too late for many.

As of early August 2023, about 128 600 are estimated or projected to be in IPC/CH Phase 5 during the peak analyses in four countries (see figure 1.2). In Haiti, 19 200 people were projected to be in IPC Phase 5 in early 2023. However, a projection update for the period March–June 2023 capturing the peak number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above did not include any population in IPC Phase 5. The total population in IPC/CH Phase 5 in 2023 is lower than the 376 000 estimated in 2022 in seven countries – Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Haiti, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen – partly due to the scale-up of timely assistance in contexts like Afghanistan, Haiti and Somalia, and improving conditions in some areas. However, no breakdown by phase is available in 2023 for Yemen, which had 31 000 people in IPC Phase 5 in 2022.

In **South Sudan**, the population in IPC Phase 5 was projected to halve from 87 000 in April–July 2022 to 43 000 in April–July 2023.

In **Burkina Faso**, the population in CH Phase 5 increased significantly from 1 800 in October–December 2022 to 42 700 in June–August 2023, the highest CH Phase 5 figure ever projected for the country.


There is a significant decrease in **Somalia** from 214 100 people during October–December 2022 to 40 400 during April–June 2023. Areas classified at Risk of Famine in 2022 are no longer so in 2023, including agropastoral communities in Burhakaba district (Bay region), and IDPs in Mogadishu and Baidoa settlements. This is attributable to humanitarian assistance, declining food prices, and improved access to income-generating activities – mainly due to a better-than-expected performance of the October–December 2022 Deyr rainy season.

In **Mali**, for the first time in the history of the CH and the GRFC, 2 500 people face CH Phase 5 in 2023.

The prevalence of the analysed population in IPC/CH Phase 5 across the four countries ranges from 0.01 percent (Mali) to 0.35 percent (South Sudan).

FIGURE 1.3

The ten countries with more than 1 million people in IPC/CH Phase 4



*IPC analysis pending government approval at the time of publication. Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023; CH, 2023.


Populations in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4): 33.64 million people in 36 countries

Households estimated to be in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) either have large food consumption gaps, which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and death rates that are 2–4 times higher than in normal conditions, or they can mitigate these food gaps only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation, putting at serious risk their future livelihoods. By early August 2023, 33.64 million people face or are projected to face IPC/CH Phase 4 in 36 countries with IPC/CH data.

When comparing the same countries with disaggregated data in 2022 and 2023, the prevalence has remained unchanged at 3.8 percent of the analysed population with notable differences by country. Numbers particularly increased in the Sudan (+3.15 million) and decreased in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (-450 000). Bangladesh, where the analysis coverage was expanded in 2023, has 2.2 million people in IPC Phase 4. The Sudan and Afghanistan have the largest populations in this phase (see figure 6), while South Sudan and Haiti have the highest proportion of their populations in this phase, at 23 percent and 18 percent respectively.

FIGURE 1.4

Countries with more than 40 percent of the analysed population in IPC Phase 2



* In Madagascar, 21% of the total population was analysed. In Zambia, 71% was analysed. Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023.

Populations in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2): 285 million people in 39 countries


People facing Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) have minimally adequate food consumption but must adopt stress coping strategies to support non-food needs. They are acutely food insecure and highly vulnerable to shocks, so increases in populations facing this phase could indicate a decrease in resilience and increased risk of populations falling into more severe phases of acute food insecurity.

In 2023, nearly 285 million people are in IPC/CH Phase 2 in 39 countries with IPC/CH analyses. This is higher than in 2022 (around 253 million people in 41 countries), although further analysis would be necessary to determine the dynamics across different phases.

The countries with the highest numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 2 are Nigeria (63.98 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (46.84 million) and the Sudan (17.09 million). They account for 45 percent of the total number of people in this phase. For a clearer picture of a country's higher vulnerability to potential shocks and need for external support to protect livelihoods, figure 1.4 highlights the proportion of the analysed population in this phase: six countries have more than 40 percent of their analysed population in IPC Phase 2 indicating that a high proportion of people require social protection, disaster risk reduction and livelihood support to reduce their vulnerability to shocks.

MAP 1.2

Percentage change in number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in 33 countries/territories from 2022–2023*




* Of the 48 countries with 2023 data, 33 have comparable point estimates because they use the same data source for 2022 and 2023 and have less than a 10 percent difference in analysis coverage.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

Source: FSIN, GRFC Mid-Year Update 2023.

MAP 1.3

The difference in share of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in 33 countries/territories from 2022–2023*




* Of the 48 countries with 2023 data, 33 have comparable point estimates because they use the same data source for 2022 and 2023 and have less than a 10 percent difference in analysis coverage.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.


Source: FSIN, GRFC Mid-Year Update 2023.

FIGURE 1.5

The 10 food crises with largest populations facing high acute food insecurity by early August 2023



In 2022, over 36 million people faced high acute food insecurity in three countries that had no data by early August 2023



Myanmar, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine were among the ten food crises with the largest populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2022.

Source: IPC TWGs, CH, FEWS NET, HRP, HNO, REACH, 2022 and 2023.

The worst food crises by magnitude and by prevalence

Highest numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent

By early August 2023, up to 167 million people are in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent in the ten largest food crises. No 2023 data are available for three of the largest food crises of 2022 – Myanmar, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine, which collectively had more than 36 million highly acutely food-insecure people in 2022.

See figure 1.5.

For the seven countries that have been among the ten largest food crises in both 2022 and 2023, the population in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above increased from 127 million in 2022 to up to 141 million in 2023 with the Sudan accounting for the bulk of the increase. There were changes in methodologies for Ethiopia and Yemen and a significant increase in the population analysed in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nigeria, which need to be considered when making year-on-year comparisons.

In eight of the countries, more than 10 million people are facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. Six countries alone account for over half of the number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent globally – the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Yemen.

Highest shares of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent


Across the 48 countries, 21 percent of the overall analysed population are facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent.

South Sudan has the highest share (63 percent) followed by Yemen (52–55 percent). Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Haiti and the Sudan each have more than 40 percent of their population in IPC Phase 3 or above. See figure 1.6.

In some countries, the food security analyses focussed on the most food-insecure areas. For instance, in Bangladesh, Kenya, Madagascar and Pakistan where less than a third of the national populations were analysed, 31–36 percent are in IPC Phase 3 or above.

FIGURE 1.6

The 10 food crises with highest prevalence of the analysed population facing high acute food insecurity by early August 2023




IPC/CH Phase 3+

Only localized areas were analysed in Madagascar and Pakistan.

Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023; FEWS NET, 2023.

FIGURE 1.7

Countries with more than 50 percent of the refugee population facing high acute food insecurity by early August 2023



IPC/CH Phase 3+ WFP CARI moderate + severe acute food insecurity

Source: IPC TWG, 2022; WFP CARI, 2023.

High levels of child wasting in food crises

Persisting high levels of acute food insecurity, coupled with other underlying factors, such as inadequate child and maternal feeding practices, limited access to healthcare, and high prevalence of infectious diseases, continue to drive high levels of child wasting and maternal acute malnutrition across food-crisis countries.

According to estimates available as of early August 2023 for 21 of the 48 food crises included in this Mid-Year Update, about 27.2 million children under 5 years are affected by wasting – which is the main form of child acute malnutrition – of whom nearly 7.2 million are severely affected. Data on maternal malnutrition are available for 15 countries where an estimated 6.3 million Pregnant and Breastfeeding Women (PBW) suffer from acute malnutrition.

Since many of the malnutrition analyses covered periods straddling 2022 and 2023, it is not possible to provide year-on-year comparisons. Where comparisons are possible, increases in the number of children under 5 years suffering from wasting between 2022 and 2023 were recorded in Mauritania (+23 percent), Kenya (+10 percent) and the Sudan (+9 percent).


In Burkina Faso and Yemen, a reduction of the geographical coverage of the nutrition assessments associated with conflict-related access constraints and inadequate evidence resulted in lower estimates for child and maternal malnutrition. However, when the areas covered in both 2022 and 2023 are compared there is a year-on-year rise in the number of children under 5 years affected by wasting.

Data gaps are notable in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean regions.

The situation in East Africa is of concern as recent estimates indicate that a severe deterioration of the nutrition situation might be happening in the Sudan and neighbouring countries based on screenings made among displaced populations. See *Focus: Conflict in the Sudan*, page 27.

MAP 1.4

Numbers of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in 48 countries/territories in 2023




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

Source: IPC TWGs, CH, FEWS NET, WFP CARI, 2022 and 2023.

MAP 1.5

Share of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent in 48 countries/territories in 2023



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.
 Source: IPC TWGs, CH, FEWS NET, WFP CARI, 2022 and 2023.

Spotlight | Lower international food prices have not eased economic pressures at macro and household levels

International food prices had been trending downward since their peak in March 2022 with the start of the war in Ukraine, but they remain at historically high levels (FAO, June 2023).

The FAO Food Price Index averaged 123.9 points in July 2023, which represents a 1.3 percent increase over the previous month, but still a 12 percent decrease from July 2022 (FAO Food Price Index, July 2023). See *figure 1.8*. These lower prices have not translated into relief in many domestic markets for a host of reasons, including a stronger US dollar vis-à-vis national currencies, continued high prices of agricultural inputs, and rising levels of public debt in many countries, as explained further below (FAO/WFP, May 2023).

Thirty nine of the 73 countries/territories selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2023 experienced minor decreases in food inflation during the first six months of 2023 (5 percentage points on average). Rwanda, Türkiye and Sri Lanka saw significant reductions: having started the year with food price inflation rates of over 50 percent, they saw them decrease by more than 20 percentage points by June 2023. The opposite occurred in another 20 GRFC countries/territories where domestic food prices continued to rise, with the largest increases seen in Egypt, Lebanon and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. See *map 1.6*.

High domestic food prices, together with increased energy costs, particularly in low and middle income countries, have been the main drivers of the persistence of the cost-of-living crisis. Countries continue to move through the cycle of inflation, increasing debt burdens and currency depreciation (IMF, June 2023; GRFC 2023). A significant number of low-income countries has been assessed as being at, or at high risk of, debt distress as of early 2023 (WB, June 2023). As a result, many countries have been limited in their ability to import foods (FAO, June, 2023).

This macroeconomic distress in the countries/territories selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2023 – over 75 percent of which are net-food importers – continued to constrain household purchasing power and exacerbate issues of food access (GRFC 2023; FAO/WFP, May 2023).

Governments' room to manoeuvre fiscal policy, in particular their ability to sustain social protection or other measures that could mitigate this negative impact on households, is limited by the combination of weak growth prospects, low foreign exchange reserves, high levels of public debt and elevated borrowing costs (FAO, June 2023; WB, June 2023).

The war in Ukraine continues to create uncertainty in global food markets

Uncertainty due to the war in Ukraine continues to make international food prices sensitive to any global food supply changes – perceived or real. The Kakhovka dam breach in June 2023 and the termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in July 2023, are two factors linked to the conflict that could decrease the amount of exportable surpluses and the volume of exports, therefore influencing future global food supplies and the stability of international food prices.


The actual impact of the dam breach will largely depend on production developments in other main producing countries that contribute to availability on the global markets. Nevertheless, disruption in irrigation on both sides of the Dnipro River will have a significant effect on the production of nutritious high-value foods, such as fruits and vegetables, supplying mostly domestic markets (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023). In southern Ukraine loss of irrigation could decrease yields, as well as reduce local incomes and producers' investments in their land (UNCT, June 2023; IFPRI, June 2023).

The United Nations-brokered BSGI between the Russian Federation, Türkiye and Ukraine helped alleviate some of

FIGURE 1.8

FAO Nominal Food Price Index, January 2022–July 2023

Base year equivalent: 2014–2016=100



Source: FAO, July 2023.

the upward pressures on global food prices after it was signed in July 2022 (GRFC 2023) despite unpredictability surrounding its implementation. In December 2022, and again at the beginning of May 2023, the Russian Federation slowed the rate of daily inspections of ships leaving the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk and in particular Pivdennyi (UN, July 2023). The latest constraint to vessel movement halved the amount of cargo shipped – down from over 2.7 million tonnes in April 2023 to 1.3 million in May 2023 (UN, July 2023).

Nevertheless, nearly 33 million metric tonnes of grains, maize and other agricultural products were exported from Ukraine in the year to mid-July 2023 (UN, July 2023), with over half going to low and middle-income countries and humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Somalia (UN, July 2023; IFPRI, August 2023). Egypt and Bangladesh were the two GRFC 2023 countries that received the most food commodities through the BSGI,

nearly 1.6 million and 1.1 million tonnes respectively (UN, July 2023).

Since the signing of the BSGI Memorandum of Understanding, the Russian Federation exported large volumes of fertilizers, wheat and oilseeds after ideal weather conditions during the 2022/23 season supported record-high wheat outputs. This high quantity of exports occurred despite the Russian Federation imposing restrictions on the export of their own agricultural products, such as sunflower oil, rice, wheat, maize and nitrogen-based fertilizers (USDA, May 2023; FAO, June 2023; UN, July 2023).


The BSGI was not renewed by the Russian Federation on 17 July 2023. Ukraine must now find alternatives to export its agricultural products, including through the Solidarity Lanes, which would be costlier. This could lead to lower prices for Ukrainian producers, thus driving reduction in the 2024 production of wheat and maize (IFPRI, July 2023; FAO, July 2023).

While the immediate effect of the BSGI termination on international food prices was negligible, it remains unclear what the long-term impact will be. Prices for key food commodities are likely to remain responsive to potential shortfalls in terms of the continued availability of Ukrainian exportable surpluses in combination with the evolution of cropping conditions in other large producing countries (FAO, July 2023).

Any potential changes to global market supplies and international prices could be exacerbated by low levels of global grain stocks and the erosion of country and household resilience (FAO, July 2023). The lingering effects of successive economic shocks combined with likely changes in supply and demand for foodstuffs due to weather extremes resulting from El Niño suggest a turbulent rest of 2023.

MAP 1.6

Annual food inflation in GRFC-qualifying countries/territories as of June 2023



■ <0 percent
 ■ 0–10 percent
 ■ 11–20 percent
 ■ 21–50 percent
 ■ 51–100 percent
 ■ >100 percent
 ■ Data unavailable
 ■ Country not selected for analysis

Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Rwanda and Türkiye were selected for inclusion in the GRFC only because they were hosting refugee populations in need of humanitarian assistance. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

Source: WFP Economic Explorer, 2023.

Spotlight | El Niño returns amid multiple global crises

After a rare three successive years of La Niña, it was confirmed in June 2023 that El Niño conditions had developed in the tropical Pacific, setting the stage for increased global temperatures and more intense weather extremes over the next nine to 12 months (NOAA, June 2023; WMO, July 2023).

These conditions are currently predicted to increase into either a moderately strong (80 percent probability), strong (50 percent), or historically strong event (20 percent), with conditions peaking in January/February 2024 (NOAA, July 2023).

The return of El Niño this year could have significant impacts as it coincides with and contributes to the ongoing effects of multiple global crises (NOAA, July 2023), including the continued recovery from COVID-19, the war in Ukraine and already exceptionally high global temperatures.

During a typical El Niño event, global declines in the production of major staple crops (wheat, rice and maize) and associated increases in their prices are observed (CGIAR, 2014). These crops represent an important share of calories in total food consumption, especially in low-income countries. Reduced supply and increased prices affect vulnerable households' food access, especially in import-dependent countries (FAO, April 2023).

Reductions in global economic growth were also observed following previous El Niño events, with some negative country-level impacts persisting for years. A study on the effects of El Niño by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which analysed historical data from 1979 to 2013, showed strong regional variance in its impact and that almost all countries experienced a short-lived increase in inflationary pressures due to spikes in energy and non-fuel commodity prices (IMF, April 2015).

A more recent study showed that El Niño reduces economic growth over time, attributing USD 4.1 trillion and USD 5.7 trillion in global income losses to the 1982–83 and 1997–98 El Niño events, respectively (Science, May 2023).

What is El Niño?

El Niño is the warming phase of the naturally occurring La Niña/El Niño climate pattern, otherwise known as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO).

During an El Niño year, warming waters in the Pacific Ocean result in changes to global atmospheric circulation that typically lead to above-average rainfall in Central Asia and the Horn of Africa and drought-like conditions in Central America, most of South and Southeast Asia, as well as Southern Africa and the Sahel (FEWS NET, 2020). See map 1.7.

The socioeconomic impacts of these changes in weather patterns are not distributed evenly around the globe, with some countries benefiting and others suffering. However, the overall effect on global agricultural production, prices and economic growth has tended to be negative. See map 1.8.


Droughts drive high levels of acute food insecurity during El Niño in major food crises

An FSIN analysis of countries defined as major food crises in the Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) from 2017 to 2021 (i.e., data from 2016 to 2020) found that more than 100 major food crises were primarily driven by weather extremes – nearly a quarter of which were linked to the two previous El Niño events in 2015–16 and 2018–19.¹ In each case, the change in weather patterns prolonged drought conditions. Haiti was the only country to experience both a drought and hurricane (Hurricane Matthew in 2016) induced by the 2015–16 El Niño. While no two El Niño events are the same, this analysis supports efforts to mitigate and minimize the potential adverse impacts of future events, particularly in areas where there could be back-to-back weather extremes.

¹ Other countries that were either not selected for inclusion in the GRFC, lacked data, or not defined as major food crises were also affected by the 2015–16 and/or 2018–19 El Niños. These included El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea and Viet Nam. Some major food-crisis countries were counted more than once due to the prolonged effects of the El Niño events.

MAP 17


Typical impacts of El Niño on precipitation patterns



Source: Columbia Climate School International Research Institute for Climate and Society.

MAP 18

Annual national cereal production in comparison to average during El Niño years, 1981–2022



The map shows analyses at the national level. At a sub-national level, cereal production trends may be different, depending on the local cropping system and timing of rainfall/agricultural seasons. Additionally, for areas that receive more than one rainy season per year, El Niños may not affect all rainy seasons during the year equally.

Source: WFP, August 2023.

The analysis reflects other findings that droughts are the principal risk to agricultural production and food security during El Niño events (FAO, 2014; UNDRR, 2021). The intensity of its impact on crop development, particularly cereals, depends on when in the crop lifecycle the event's peak period of influence occurs, as certain phases are more sensitive to water and heat stress than others (FAO, 2014).

In addition to its effects on crop yields, droughts can limit water supplies, create livestock losses, and reduce energy production. These effects intersect and then cascade through socioecological and technical systems at different scales, and persist long after the drought has ended (UNDRR, 2021). The knock-on effects can lead to livelihood losses, higher food prices, worsening poverty and increased rates of malnutrition and disease.

For El Niño-driven droughts included in the GRFC, the severity of the impacts corresponds to the strength of each event. The 2015–16 El Niño was one of the strongest and most widespread events in the last half century (NOAA, 2016) while the 2018–19 one was relatively weak (NOAA, August 2019). This difference is mirrored in the GRFC, as there were more countries and populations affected by the 2015–16 El Niño than the 2018–19 event. For instance, ten GRFC countries/territories were affected by the 2015–16 El Niño, and six impacted by the 2018–19 event.

The impacts were always compounded by successive weather extremes. During these back-to-back shocks, household resilience to shocks would be eroded due to loss of assets and livelihoods, as well as the early depletion of food stocks, thus creating market dependence at a time when food prices were increasing. In the case of all the food crises linked to the 2015–16 El Niño, there were drought conditions during previous season(s) that had already affected agricultural production (GRFC 2017).

Similarly, Central American countries and Pakistan (Balochistan and Sindh provinces only) experienced prolonged drought conditions prior to the 2018–19 El Niño events (GRFC 2019; GRFC 2020), and in the following year, there was flooding in Central American countries (GRFC 2020).

Effects of the historic 2015–16 El Niño on food insecurity lingered for years

The El Niño event that peaked in November 2015 caused significant rainfall variation around the world, which triggered droughts in the Caribbean, Central America, parts of the Horn of Africa, and southern Africa (FAO, 2016).

The region with the highest number, prevalence and severity of food crises during the event was Central and Southern Africa where roughly 14.2 million people were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) across six countries in 2016. *See figure 1.9.*


Decreased production of staple crops – primarily maize – due to droughts in 2016 created domestic supply shortages throughout the region. The resulting steep rise in food prices cascaded into broader economic downturns, as well as contributed to the depreciation of national currencies in the Central and Southern Africa region. This added additional upward pressure to food prices while also reducing countries' ability to import food (GRFC 2017).

Acute food insecurity outcomes in Central and Southern Africa worsened in 2017 despite El Niño conditions ending in June 2016. The number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above reached over 14.5 million. *See Figure 1.9.* In this region, recovery from the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of El Niño was difficult because households' resilience was weakened by the poor 2015 agricultural season (GRFC 2017), and the knock-on economic impacts that these El Niño-driven droughts caused (GRFC 2018). In fact, there were still references to communities not having recovered from its impacts in Eswatini, Lesotho, southern Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe through the GRFC 2019.

The 2015–16 El Niño exacerbated drought conditions in some areas of East Africa and led to above-average rainfalls in others. Prolonged drought conditions affected Djibouti, northeastern Ethiopia and northern Somalia while flooding occurred in the Afar, Amhara, Oromia and Somali regions of Ethiopia, as well as the southern and central regions of Somalia. These weather extremes led to crop failures, fewer rural employment opportunities, widespread shortages of water and pasture with consequent increases in livestock deaths (GRFC 2017).

FIGURE 1.9

Number of people facing IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, primarily due to 2015–16 El Niño



■ IPC Phase 3+ ■ WFP CARI moderate + severe acute food insecurity

Central and Southern Africa: Eswatini, Lesotho, southern Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. East Africa: Djibouti, Ethiopia (2016 data only), Somalia (2016 data only).

Source: GRFC 2017 and 2018.

However, the GRFC 2018 did not cite El Niño as a factor in either Ethiopia or Somalia's droughts during 2017, which is why the number of people facing IPC Phase 3 or above drops between 2016 and 2017 in *figure 1.9* (GRFC 2018).

A weaker 2018–19 El Niño resulted in fewer major drought-induced food crises

The weaker El Niño event of 2018–19 translated into less severe impacts on agricultural production and food security overall. However, Haiti and the Central American Dry Corridor experienced food crises that were primarily driven by changes in weather patterns from this event (GRFC 2019). Drought in Haiti depressed production of the main cereal crops, except for rice, which again contributed to further weakening of vulnerable households' resilience (GRFC 2019). The irregular rainfall and drier-than-normal conditions in the Central American Dry Corridor led to crop losses that jeopardized livelihoods (GRFC 2019).

The GRFC 2020 reported that Balochistan and Sindh provinces in Pakistan faced acute food insecurity in 2019 primarily driven by the 2018–19 El Niño droughts (GRFC 2020). Over 3 million people were in IPC Phase 3 or

above during the 2019 peak, of whom more than 1 million faced IPC Phase 4 conditions (GRFC 2020). The 2018–19 El Niño was a secondary driver in Haiti in 2019, as it continued to affect precipitation levels, which resulted in higher food prices (GRFC 2020).

The 2023–2024 El Niño forecast

The extent of the current El Niño event's impacts on agriculture and food security will depend on a complex interplay of meteorological, seasonal and vulnerability factors that are difficult to predict and analyse.

Most regional outlooks forecast typical El Niño patterns, but rainfall in the Sahel and parts of the Pacific could deviate from expectations (WFP, August 2023). The Sahel, which would typically see drier conditions, is expected to experience average to above-average rainfall during the 2023 rainy season (June–September) while parts of Myanmar, Philippines and Viet Nam are forecast to receive below-average amounts of rainfall.

The historically dry regions of southern Africa are forecast to experience average or below-average rainfall. In East Africa, below-average rainfall and higher temperatures are expected in August–October 2023 in eastern Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda, but Kenya and Somalia could experience flooding. Below-average rainfall is predicted for the Caribbean coast of Central America in line with historical El Niño trends, increasing the risk of drought conditions for the second agricultural season. Parts of Southeast Asia and the Pacific will likely see above-average rainfall while there could be below-average rainfall in Indonesia and Timor-Leste. The southeastern areas of Pakistan (including Sindh province) are forecast to receive average to below-average rains between June and September (WFP, August 2023).

The observed secondary impacts to growth, food prices and inflation are also of concern, as low- and middle-income countries are still suffering the consequences of the back-to-back shocks of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. These countries are less resilient due to low global stockpiles of grain, increasing public debt and weak growth prospects, and may therefore be less able to ease the transmission of any additional food price volatility to vulnerable households (IMF, July 2023).



CHAPTER 2

REGIONAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD CRISES IN 2023


Central and Southern Africa

Angola | Central African Republic | Democratic Republic of the Congo | Eswatini | Lesotho | Madagascar | Malawi | Mozambique | Namibia | United Republic of Tanzania | Zambia | Zimbabwe

Regional improvements in food security driven by better food availability and access in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia

 Up to **46.72M** people or **19%** of the analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above in 2023 in 12 countries

41.72M of them are in 10 countries with IPC analyses



Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023.

4.0–5.0M of them are in two countries with FEWS NET analyses

 **Zimbabwe (3.0–3.5M)** and **Angola (1.0–1.5M)**

Source: FEWS NET, 2023.

Twelve countries with data by early August 2023

Out of 13 countries that were selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2023, all have data for 2023 except the Republic of Congo (residents and refugees).

Acute food insecurity overview

Up to 46.7 million people or 19 percent of the analysed population were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 according to data available as of early August 2023 for 12 countries.

Since the release of the GRFC 2023 in May, new data for 2023 became available for Angola, where the source changed from IPC to FEWS NET, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.



Out of the ten countries with IPC data, six – the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia – had peak estimates that straddle 2022 and 2023, therefore the estimates, 14.9 million people, are the same as the 2022 peak included in the GRFC 2023. In the remaining four countries – the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Eswatini and Lesotho – the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above declined by 1 million from 27.9 million in 2022 to 26.8 million in 2023, reflecting decreases in all four countries.

In Zimbabwe, FEWS NET analyses for 2023 indicated that the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above was 3.0–3.5 million people between January and March 2023, close to or just higher than the 2022 peak of 3.0 million between October and December, reflecting the persisting effects of economic and weather shocks on household food access and availability (FEWS NET, February 2023).

Ten of the 12 countries met the criteria for being considered major food crises – Angola, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe – with at least 1 million people or 20 percent of their population in IPC Phase 3 or above.

MAP 2.1

Number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above, 2023




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: IPC TWGs 2022 and 2023; FEWS NET (Angola and Zimbabwe).

FIGURE 2.1

Share of analysed population by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023



This chart ranks countries from highest prevalence of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above to lowest.

Source: IPC TWGs 2022 and 2023; FEWS NET (Angola and Zimbabwe).

Three countries with new 2023 analyses (since March 2023)

Angola

In Angola, the most recent FEWS NET acute food insecurity analysis estimated that by June 2023, 500 000–750 000 people would be facing high levels of acute food insecurity, rising to 1–1.5 million people by December 2023. The foreseen deterioration is linked to the effects of rising food prices resulting from steep currency depreciation in May 2023, the removal of fuel subsidies in June 2023 and difficulties importing agricultural inputs due to decreasing foreign reserves, as well as the impact of consecutive seasons of drought in southern areas (FEWS NET, June 2023).

Central African Republic

The May 2023 IPC analysis shows an improved food security situation with 2.4 million people in IPC Phase 3 or above during April–August 2023, and 2.1 million from September 2023–March 2024. The projection of 2.7 million people in September 2022–March 2023 (included in the GRFC 2023) remains the peak for 2023 as per GRFC protocols (IPC, November 2022). Conflict and high commodity prices continue to drive high levels of acute food insecurity, affecting 39 percent of the population from April–August 2023 (IPC, May 2023).¹

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which accounts for more than half of the region's population in IPC Phase 3 or above, a projection update of the IPC analysis for the January to June 2023 period estimates nearly 600 000 fewer people in IPC Phase 3 or above than the 2022 peak estimate of 26.4 million in July–December 2022. This reflects improved household food access and availability following the harvest of staple crops (IPC, October 2022; IPC, May 2023). However, in the eastern provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, escalating armed conflict is leading to more population displacements and a 5 percent increase in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity. In the seven areas covered by the IPC update (Rutshuru, Nyiragongo, Masisi, Beni and Goma in North Kivu, and Djugu and Mambasa

in Ituri), 1.3 million people have moved from IPC Phases 1 and 2 to IPC Phases 3 and 4. The area classification for Djugu and Rutshuru has deteriorated from IPC Phase 3 to IPC Phase 4 (IPC, May 2023). The update does not factor in the effects of floods and landslides during the first half of 2023 in South Kivu, Tanganyika, Haut-Lomami and Kasai.

Drivers



Conflict/insecurity remains the key driver of acute food insecurity in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and northern Mozambique. Conflict continues to disrupt markets and agricultural production and to drive population displacements in northern and western Central African Republic, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Cabo Delgado region of northern Mozambique, constraining agricultural production and threatening food security (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

The presence of about 1 million IDPs in the seven analysed areas in North Kivu and Ituri provinces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the city of Goma, continues to put pressure on local livelihoods and resources. Despite a 19 percent reduction in IDPs from the November 2022 peak in northern Mozambique, the Cabo Delgado conflict continues to drive high levels of displacement with 834 300 IDPs overall as of March 2023 (IOM, March 2023).

Around 452 000 people were internally displaced in northern and western Central African Republic as of June 2023 (IOM DTM, June 2023). In addition, the eruption of conflict in the Sudan from mid-April led to an estimated 15 300 refugees arriving in the country from the Sudan as of early July, including 10 600 Sudanese refugees and 4 700 Central African returnees, the majority (95 percent) of them women and children (UNHCR, July 2023).



Economic shocks are considered the main driver of acute food insecurity in Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, while being significant drivers in conflict-

affected countries due to disruptions to markets and agricultural livelihoods. In Zimbabwe, following some declines in preceding months, food inflation reached 256 percent in June 2023, up from 117 percent and

102 percent in the previous two months, largely reflecting its weakening currency (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

Prices of cereals and cereal products in import-dependent Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia were higher year-on-year in the second quarter of 2023, reflecting increased production costs in South Africa, coupled with high prices on the international market (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023). Currency depreciation in these three countries has supported inflationary pressure on food prices.

In conflict-affected countries, ongoing insecurity and displacement continue to affect agricultural activities by disrupting the availability and increasing prices of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers and improved seeds, which could result in low application rates and consequent impacts on yields and/or areas planted (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).



Weather extremes are the main drivers of acute food insecurity in Angola, Madagascar and the United Republic of Tanzania, and major contributors in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. Between February and March 2023, cyclone Freddy caused widespread flooding and extensive crop damage

and losses in southern districts of Malawi, as well as in Madagascar and Mozambique where it led to localized flooding and crop damage (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

In Mozambique, according to data as of mid-April from the National Institute for Disaster Management, around 1.19 million people were affected by Freddy's first and second landfall across eight provinces with that of Zambezia the most damaged by its second landfall (IOM DTM, April 2023).

Madagascar and Mozambique were further affected by rainfall deficits in northern areas that reduced cereal yields, while weather conditions were more favourable for crop production in the main central cereal-producing regions (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

Abnormal dryness in the United Republic of Tanzania during the growing season for staple crops continues to impact agricultural production (FEWS NET, April 2023). Dry conditions in localized areas of southern Angola and northern Namibia are constraining food availability and reducing income-earning opportunities from crop sales (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023; FEWS NET, June 2023).


In Zambia, the 2022 cereal harvest was below average due to unfavourable weather conditions, including heavy rainfall and consequent flooding, and rainfall deficits in areas bordering Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique (IPC, August 2022; FAO-GIEWS, December 2022).

Nutrition overview

Malnutrition data for 2023 are only available for three countries, all of which report high levels of child wasting and maternal acute malnutrition: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which accounts for nearly 80 percent of the total number of children under 5 years with wasting in the region, the Central African Republic and Madagascar. In these three countries, about 3.56 million children under 5 years old are estimated to be suffering from wasting in 2023, of whom 1.06 million are severely wasted. According to data available for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, an estimated 2.35 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are acutely malnourished.

FIGURE 2.2

Annual food inflation, June 2023



Data for Madagascar refer to April 2023; data for Angola, Eswatini and Lesotho refer to May 2023; all other data refer to June 2023. No recent data are available for Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Source: WFP Economic Explorer, 2023.

¹ This IPC analysis was still pending government approval at the time of publication of this Mid-Year Update.

East Africa


Burundi | Djibouti | Ethiopia | Kenya | Somalia | South Sudan | Sudan | Uganda

The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity is the largest in eight years of GRFC reporting

 Up to **65.2M** people or **23%** of the analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above, in 2023 in eight countries

42.69M of them are in six countries with IPC analyses

35.21M in 6 countries | **30.16M** in 6 countries | **12.44M** in 6 countries | **83 350** in 2 countries



Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023.

21.0–22.49M of them are in two countries with FEWS NET analyses


 **Ethiopia (19.0–19.99M)** and **Uganda (2.0–2.5M)**

Source: FEWS NET, 2023.

Eight countries with data by early August 2023

Of the ten countries in the region that were selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2023, eight have data available for 2023 that met GRFC requirements – Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda – while no data are available for Eritrea and Rwanda (refugees).

Populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5)

 In **Somalia** the number of people projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during April–June 2023 decreased to around 40 400, mostly located in the regions of Bay, Middle Shabelle and Mudug, down from the 214 100 estimated to be in this phase during October–December 2022 (IPC December 2022; IPC, April 2023), mostly in Bay, Banadir and Mudug. From June 2023, a further decrease was projected (IPC, April 2023). Risk of Famine is no longer a concern.

In **South Sudan**, 43 000 people faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during April–July 2023, 36 000 in Jonglei and 7 000 in Unity states. This is an increase from the 33 000 estimated to be facing Catastrophe in December 2022–March 2023, but is less severe when compared to the same period of the previous year when about 87 000 people were estimated to be in this phase (IPC, November, 2022).



Acute food insecurity overview

East Africa’s escalating regional food crisis is driven by the devastating impacts of the conflict in the Sudan since April 2023 as well as a difficult recovery from the unprecedented drought in the Horn of Africa in tandem with widespread economic shocks, weather extremes and ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan.

As of early August 2023, up to 65.2 million people or 23 percent of the analysed population in eight countries were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), the largest number in eight years of GRFC reporting. All the countries except

MAP 2.2

Number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above, 2023





The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023; FEWS NET 2023 (Ethiopia and Uganda).

FIGURE 2.3

Share of analysed population by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023



This chart ranks countries from highest prevalence of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above to lowest.

Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023; FEWS NET 2023 (Ethiopia and Uganda).

Djibouti met the criteria for being defined as major food crises with at least 1 million people or 20 percent of their population in IPC Phase 3 or above.

At regional level, the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above increased by 15 percent between 2022 and 2023, while the population analysed increased by 6 percent between the two years. The share of the population in these phases increased marginally from 22 percent to 23 percent.

Comparable data for 2022 and 2023 is available for all countries except Ethiopia, where the source changed from the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) to FEWS NET, and Kenya. Ethiopia still has the region's highest numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

The Sudan is experiencing the biggest global increase in the magnitude and prevalence of acute food insecurity. Burundi, Djibouti and Somalia are also among the GRFC countries with major increases since 2022. In South Sudan, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity remains similar to 2022.

However, the severity of acute food insecurity decreased in Somalia and in South Sudan where the populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are lower than in 2022.

Five of the eight countries – Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan – have new peak numbers based on analyses for 2023 released since the publication of the GRFC 2023 in May, while for Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda the projections from 2022 are used.¹

Five countries with new 2023 peak numbers (since March 2023)

Burundi

In Burundi, 2.3 million people, or 19 percent of the population, were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the April–May 2023 minor lean season, of whom 105 000, or 1 percent of the population, were expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The 65 percent increase compared to the 2022 peak of October–December, when 1.4 million people were in IPC

¹ While new 2023 analyses are available for Kenya (IPC) and Uganda (FEWS NET), the peak numbers were those projected in the 2022 analyses.



Following consecutive seasons of prolonged and devastating drought since 2020, heavy rainfall episodes during the March–May 2023 rainy season caused flooding in key cropping areas of southern Somalia.

Phase 3 or above (IPC, September 2022), is one of the highest increases globally and stems from continued deterioration in households' purchasing power due to high fuel prices and high levels of inflation, as well as delayed rainfall followed by floods. The number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above was expected to decrease to 1.2 million or 9 percent of the population, from June–September 2023, with all livelihood zones classified in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) during the harvest period (IPC, May 2023).

Djibouti

During July–December 2023, 285 400 people are expected to be in IPC Phase 3 or above, corresponding to 24 percent of the population – one of the largest increases globally compared to the same period in 2022, when 192 200 people, or 16 percent of the population, were estimated to be in these phases. The severity of acute food insecurity is projected to increase, with the number of people in IPC Phase 4 estimated at 100 100 (8 percent of the population) up from

12 400 (1 percent of the population), driven by rising food prices, high unemployment and floods. Seasonal factors are expected to exacerbate the situation in July–December, including intense heat and lower supply of animal products (IPC, June 2023).

Ethiopia

The FEWS NET analysis of People in Need (PIN) estimated that 19–19.99 million people were in need of urgent food assistance during the peak period of acute food insecurity in July 2023 (FEWS NET, July 2023).

The food insecurity situation in Ethiopia varies from region to region. In general, below-average Kiremt rains in some areas are expected to limit income from crop sales as well as labour opportunities compared to a typical year. While conflict in the north and drought in the south and southeast have subsided, the erosion of livelihoods during these protracted shocks have hindered the pace of recovery of food and income sources. Households in both areas face great difficulty in producing or purchasing food (FEWS NET, May 2023).

October–December's Meher harvest in key producing areas in the west and some recovery of livestock production during the Deyr/Hageya rains in the same period in southern agropastoral areas should see the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity decrease to 9.0–9.99 million by December 2023 (FEWS NET, July 2023).

Somalia

Levels of acute food insecurity remained high in Somalia in April–June 2023, with 6.6 million people or 39 percent of the population in need of urgent humanitarian food and livelihood assistance. This is an 18 percent increase (corresponding to 988 900 people) since October–December 2022, due to the lingering impact of the severe drought that spanned from late 2020 to early 2023, prices remaining above the five-year average in most markets and conflict in the areas surrounding Burhakaba and Baidoa continuing to displace tens of thousands of people (IPC, April 2023).

Of the population in IPC Phase 3 or above, 1.85 million were estimated to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). However, areas at Risk of Famine in January 2023, including agropastoral communities in Burhakaba district (Bay region), and IDPs in Mogadishu and Baidoa settlements, are no longer at risk following a significant scaling up of humanitarian assistance, declining food prices and improved access to income-generating opportunities due to a better-than-expected performance of the October–December 2022 Deyr rainy season. This corresponded with a significant decrease in the number of people facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) from 214 100 in October–December 2022 to around 40 400 in April–June 2023.

The Sudan

The eruption of conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RAF) on 15 April 2023 has led to a severe deterioration in the Sudan's pre-existing acute food insecurity crisis. During July–September 2023, 20.3 million people are estimated to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), representing 42 percent of the analysed population.

This is a rapid and dramatic increase (74 percent) over the same period in 2022, when 11.7 million (24 percent of

the analysed population) faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC, August 2023).

The population facing IPC Phase 4 has grown faster than the overall population facing acute food insecurity, having more than doubled from 3.1 million or 6 percent of the population in 2022 to 6.3 million people or 13 percent of the total population in 2023.

In states with active conflict at least half the population are in IPC Phase 3 or above including West Darfur (62 percent), Khartoum and South Kordofan (both 56 percent) and Central Darfur, East Darfur and South Darfur (all with 53 percent) (IPC, August 2023).

Ag Geneina town in West Darfur state is the worst affected, with 65 percent of the population expected to face IPC Phase 3 or above. Between October 2023 and February 2024, the situation is projected to improve, with 15 million people or 31 percent of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity but these projections are still worse than the peak estimates of 2022 (IPC, August 2023).

Drivers of the crisis, 2022–23



Weather extremes were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda.

Though rains improved significantly across many areas during the first half of 2023, recovery from the prolonged drought across the Horn of Africa, which began in 2020 and lasted until early 2023, is expected to be slow. Pastoralist populations, mainly in southern Ethiopia, northern and eastern Kenya and Somalia (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023) face prolonged livelihood recovery periods despite better pasture.

The March–May rainy season was characterized by dry spells and heavy rainfall episodes that caused flooding in key cropping areas of southern Somalia, marginal agricultural areas of southeastern and coastal Kenya, and Uganda, translating into poor production in those areas (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

During the June–September 2023 rainy season, below-average rainfall is forecast for central Ethiopia, northern and southern South Sudan, western Eritrea, western Kenya, eastern Uganda and northeastern Sudan. Wetter-

than-usual conditions are expected over southeastern Ethiopia, northern and coastal areas of Somalia, and pockets of the Sudan and of South Sudan.

The current El Niño increases the likelihood of above-average rains during the Deyr/short rains in October–December in drought-affected areas of the Horn of Africa. These may support drought recovery through better pasture for livestock and good yields for second season crops that are harvested from December but they also increase the risk of flooding (FSNWG, June 2023). Below-average rains are forecast over western parts of the region through September, including Ethiopia.



Conflict/insecurity Fighting in the Sudan from mid-April 2023 has heavily impacted food security through severe disruption of markets, livelihoods, transport and trade, and lootings of food stocks. It has reduced access to services including health and nutrition and severely impeded humanitarian access (IPC, August 2023).

It has displaced 855 000 people to neighbouring countries and 2.7 million people were newly internally displaced (UNHCR, August 2023; IOM, DTM, July 2023). Already vulnerable border communities in South Sudan have experienced additional pressure as a result of newly displaced populations (OCHA, May 2023; OCHA, July 2023).

Conflict constrains the production of staple crops, with high prices and shortages of inputs, including fuel, seed and agrichemicals and labour expected to severely constrain cereal planting and production (FAO-GIEWS July 2023). As a result, staple crop production is expected to be below average, further constrained by inadequate rains (IPC, August, 2023).

Livestock producers face constraints to access grazing zones, water, feed and pasture due to insecurity. These challenges are likely to be exacerbated by forecast below-average main season rainfalls. Insecurity and market disruptions limit herders' access to their usual markets, while the risk of animal looting has forced many herders to sell their animals at unfavourable prices due to reduced domestic demand (IPC, August, 2023).

In the Amhara and Oromia regions of Ethiopia, violence and clashes between the government and armed groups continued through the first half of 2023 (ACLEDA, 2023). In

the Tigray region there has only been a marginal recovery following the end of the conflict due to the severity and length of the conflict that eroded households' assets and coping mechanisms, as well as affected the labour market and agricultural systems. Humanitarian access issues and aid diversion has meant that many households have not received assistance (FEWS NET, May 2023).

An outbreak of violence in Las Caanood, Somalia, in the first quarter of 2023 led to internal displacement and around 100 000 people crossing the border into Ethiopia (UNHCR, May 2023).



Economic shocks were considered the primary driver in Burundi, Djibouti and South Sudan, and a major driver in all countries of the region.

High food inflation rates in East Africa have had particularly adverse consequences on food security, as households allocate high proportions of their expenditure to food purchases (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).


In the Sudan, conflict has negatively impacted households' purchasing power and while inflation has not been tracked regularly in 2023, it was projected to have passed 200 percent in June. The WFP local food basket cost increased by 11.4 percent between May and June 2023 and by 27.9 percent year-on-year (WFP, July 2023).

The conflict in the Sudan is expected to aggravate economic shocks in neighbouring countries. Breaks in the food supply chains have increased the prices of food and commodities in the northern counties of South Sudan, reducing household purchasing power (OCHA, May 2023). Since the beginning of the Sudan crisis, food prices in areas bordering the Sudan have increased by 20–84 percent (OCHA, June 2023).

In Ethiopia, the further reduction of fuel subsidies in May led to more than a 10 percent increase in fuel prices compared to previous months, further increasing transportation costs and contributing to high staple food prices (FEWS NET, May 2023).

FIGURE 2.4

Annual food inflation, June 2023



No data available for the Sudan since the onset of conflict in April. Headline inflation was 63.3 percent in February 2023.

Data for Djibouti refer to April 2023; data for Burundi refer to May 2023; all other data refer to June 2023.

Source: WFP Economic Explorer, 2023.

Nutrition overview

The already concerning acute malnutrition situation among young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women has deteriorated over the past two years exacerbated by weather extremes in the Horn of Africa and insecurity and conflict, mostly recently in the Sudan as well as in Ethiopia and Somalia. According to estimates produced in seven countries prior to the current conflict in the Sudan – Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda - about 7.68 million children under 5 years old are estimated to be suffering from wasting in 2023, of whom 1.78 million are severely wasted.

An estimated 1.89 million pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW) are acutely malnourished in 2023 in these countries – although no PBW malnutrition data for 2023 are available for Somalia. Albeit limited due to the ongoing conflict, recent estimates and assessments indicate a severe deterioration of the nutrition situation in the Sudan and among Sudanese refugee populations. See following page: Focus: Conflict in the Sudan.

Focus | Conflict in the Sudan

Since 15 April 2023, armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has had devastating consequences across the Sudan and parts of neighbouring countries.

Conflict started in cities across Northern and Khartoum states, and spread across the Darfur and Kordofan regions, with the most severe clashes occurring in the capital Khartoum and Ag Geneina town in West Darfur.

Attempts to halt the conflict and reduce its impact on civilians have not succeeded in quelling the violence. As conflict continues, it is drawing out pre-existing tensions along tribal, ethnic and socioeconomic divides, particularly in Darfur (UNHCR, June 2023).

As a result of the conflict, an additional 8.6 million people in the Sudan are facing high levels of acute food insecurity, a 74 percent increase since the 2022 peak, bringing the total to 20.3 million people (42 percent of the population) in IPC Phase 3 or above during July–September 2023 (IPC, August 2023).

The humanitarian situation is worsened by the lack of humanitarian aid in the region, and repeated looting of warehouses containing humanitarian supplies (IOM, June 2023).

The Sudan is facing major challenges to import and produce its food requirements

As a result of reduced foreign currency reserves and local currency depreciation, import and export activities have declined, with many companies involved in trading activities not functioning.

The Sudan imports around 85 percent of its annual wheat requirements, with over 50 percent originating from the Russian Federation and about 20 percent from Ukraine. The consequences of the war in Ukraine as well as conflict in the Sudan and weakened national currency have significantly disrupted wheat imports (IPC, August 2023).

The massive destruction of major food processing factories, particularly flour factories in Khartoum, and the

disruption of supply chains and trade routes across the conflict-affected areas will continue to negatively affect food availability in markets in 2023. Wheat, sugar, fuel and other imported goods have difficulty moving from the east to conflict-affected areas of the west.

There is a significant risk to domestic food production as insecurity limits access to fields and the availability of key agricultural inputs. Intercommunal violence could limit pastoral movements to access water, markets and pasture, impacting pastoralist livelihoods.

A mass displacement crisis within the Sudan and neighbouring countries

In just three months – by early August 2023 – over 3.5 million people have been displaced by the fighting, of whom 2.7 million have been internally displaced and 855 500 have crossed international borders (UNHCR, August, 2023; IOM DTM, July 2023).

The conflict is aggravating one of the world’s biggest pre-existing displacement crises – even before the conflict, the country was already hosting the sixth highest number of IDPs among all GRFC food-crisis countries (3.8 million by the end of 2022) (HNO 2022).

Since April 2023, the majority of IDPs (74 percent) have fled from Khartoum state followed by South Darfur, North Darfur, West Darfur, Central Darfur and North Kordofan. The highest proportions of IDPs have been displaced to River Nile, Northern, White Nile and Sennar states (IOM, July 2023).

Most IDPs live in host communities (69 percent), with the remainder living in rented accommodation, formal camps, improvised/critical shelters, schools and other public buildings, and open area informal settlements (IOM, July 2023).

The Sudan has also long hosted refugees, with 1.14 million individuals reported at the end of March 2023, the second highest refugee population in Africa – mainly from South Sudan, Eritrea, Syria, and Ethiopia, as well as the Central African Republic, Chad and Yemen. Since armed clashes erupted, nearly 190 000 refugees and

asylum seekers in Sudan have been displaced internally (UNHCR, July 2023).

As highlighted in *figure 2.5*, Chad has been the most frequent destination for refugees fleeing the Sudan since the latest conflict began, hosting approximately 329 200, followed by Egypt and South Sudan. In contrast to other countries, returnees comprise most of the arrivals in South Sudan (UNHCR, July 2023).

Recent changes in Egypt’s policies require Sudanese nationals to obtain a visa, challenging free movement between the two countries and leading to people being stranded in a no man’s land (between the Sudan and Egypt). According to IOM, they face dire conditions, without access to food, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services, or proper shelter, including shade (IOM, May 2023).

This multi-faceted crisis risks being further compounded by forecasted weather extremes, including above-normal rainfall increasing the risk of flooding in the northern areas of North Darfur, parts of South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, Sennar, and White Nile states. This could lead to more displacement, further limit humanitarian access to

these regions and affect agricultural production (IOM, June 2023).

An additional strain on fragile border areas

The crisis affects communities on both sides of the Sudan’s borders as refugees, asylum seekers and returnees are concentrating in areas with high levels of acute food insecurity in the Central African Republic, Chad and South Sudan (IPC, May 2023; CH March 2023; IPC, November 2022). Competition over scarce resources risks fuelling tensions between displaced populations and host communities.

Rapid assessments suggest that the price of commodities, such as sugar and millet, have almost doubled in border areas of northern Central African Republic that typically rely on cross-border trade with the Sudan (OCHA, June 2023).

In eastern Chad, rapid assessments conducted in May found that sorghum prices had doubled, limiting food access for both refugee and host households (UNHCR, May 2023). Since the beginning of the conflict, food prices in border areas of South Sudan increased by 20–84 percent (OCHA, July 2023).


In Chad, returnee populations have congregated in spontaneous locations near the border that lack essential goods and services, including food (IOM DTM, June 2023).

New arrivals in South Sudan consist predominantly of returnees. They have been using a limited number of river-based routes and transit to communities already facing high humanitarian needs, including Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region (REACH, June 2023; IPC, November 2022). New arrivals reported that food was their priority need (UNHCR, May 2023) but it has been difficult to access due to limited livelihood opportunities and rising food prices.

In Ethiopia, food assistance has struggled to keep pace with the number of arrivals (IOM, July 2023).

FIGURE 2.5

Countries receiving largest numbers of refugees fleeing Sudan, 2023



Source: UNHCR, July 2023.

A further shock to an already alarming nutrition crisis

Prior to the current violence, the wasting situation in the Sudan was among the worst of the food crises covered by the GRFC 2023 (FSIN and GNAFC, May 2023) and has been progressively deteriorating over the past years. In 2022, the prevalence of wasting among children under 5 years was equal or above the 15 percent ‘very high’ WHO threshold (OCHA, June 2022).

The ongoing conflict is expected to exacerbate the drivers of child wasting and maternal acute malnutrition, including poor access to healthy diets, inadequate child and maternal feeding practices, limited health services and poor WASH conditions. It is also driving high food prices and impeding agricultural production, contributing to inadequate food intake and dietary diversity.

Nutrition assistance to young children is being hampered and nutrition monitoring interrupted, making it difficult

FIGURE 2.6

Prevalence of children under 5 years old with wasting, between May–July, 2023

Country	SAM (%)	MAM (%)	GAM (%)
Central African Republic (border points)	-	-	16.9
Chad (border points)	6.1	18.4	24.5
Ethiopia (Kurmuk transit centre)	1.6	8.9	10.5
Ethiopia (Metema transit centre)	0.7	5.1	5.8
South Sudan (border points)	6.5	16.9	23.4
South Sudan (Renk transit centre)	7.5	18.8	26.3
Sudan (White Nile refugee settlement)	2.9	12.4	15.3

GAM (child wasting); SAM (severe child wasting); MAM (moderate child wasting).

Type of screening = cumulative MUAC screening, except for South Sudan Renk transit centre = Mass MUAC screening, and Sudan White Nile refugee settlement = routine facility MUAC data.

Source: UNHCR, June 2023.

to understand the evolving nutrition situation or react to any newly emerging needs. Conflict has interrupted provision of lifesaving prevention-of-malnutrition assistance, which prior to the conflict targeted about 2 million children under 2 years (OCHA, December 2022).

The projections provided by the Sudan HNO 2023, made before the conflict, indicated 3 million children under 5 years were expected to be affected by wasting in 2023, up from 2.76 million in 2022, with the number of severely wasted children increasing from 0.56 million in 2022 to 0.61 million in 2023, representing a 9 percent increase. In addition, about 1 million pregnant and breastfeeding women were expected to be acutely malnourished in 2023 (HNO 2023, November 2022).

The HNO projections were revised upward due to the effect of the conflict on markets, food systems, health and nutrition services, provision of government services and humanitarian assistance. The revised 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan (May 2023) projected a 30 percent increase in the number of children suffering from wasting in hotspot areas, an increase of 15 percent in states hosting large IDP populations and 10 percent elsewhere in the country (OCHA, June 2023).

Very high levels of malnutrition among populations on the move

Needs for food and basic social services including essential nutrition assistance among refugees in the Sudan and in neighbouring countries, mostly among women and children under 5 years, were already high pre-conflict. A Standardized Expanded Nutrition Survey (SENS) conducted among refugees in May 2022 indicated that 16–19 percent of children under 5 years in White Nile’s ten resettlements were suffering from wasting, above the 15 percent ‘very high’ WHO threshold, while in Gedaref’s four settlements, the prevalence ranged from 8–14 percent, considered ‘medium to high’ by WHO thresholds (UNHCR, November 2022).

Refugee and returnee populations who fled the Sudan after the onset of the conflict and have sought refuge in the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan had Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) measurements indicating levels of wasting above the 15 percent ‘very high’ WHO threshold for all countries



© OCHA/ALAKHER

The 3.5 million people displaced since April 2023 are experiencing interrupted access to nutritious food, basic health services, safe and adequate water, and sanitation, worsening acute malnutrition among young children.

except Ethiopia. The situation was the most severe in the Renk transit centre of South Sudan and border points of Chad, which recorded a wasting prevalence of 26 percent and 25 percent respectively, including also the highest percentages of severe wasting, with 7.5 percent and 6.1 percent respectively. In border crossing points of the Central African Republic, 16.9 percent of children under 5 years were affected by wasting, according to MUAC measurements. See figure 2.6.

In the Kurmuk and Metema transit centres in Ethiopia, the prevalence levels of 10.5 percent and 5.8 percent as measured by MUAC indicated a moderate nutrition situation among children under 5 years.

MUAC screenings of pregnant and breastfeeding women in May and June 2023 in two transit centres in both Ethiopia and South Sudan recorded high acute malnutrition prevalence of 25.7 percent and 17.8 percent

in Ethiopia and 13.5 percent and 28.7 percent in South Sudan.

This analysis highlights the need for targeted interventions to address child wasting and maternal malnutrition of populations on the move in these regions, particularly in Chad and South Sudan, where the prevalence of severe wasting is notably high. It also points to the need for nutrition partners to sharpen preparedness and response plans for a nutrition crisis within the Sudan once the conflict abates.

While no assessment of the nutrition situation in country is possible, the state of individuals assessed at border screenings, the pre-conflict nutrition crisis, and continued deterioration of all nutrition drivers at a national scale suggests a poor outlook for those in the middle of the conflict who lack access to food, nutrition and basic social services.


West Africa and the Sahel

Burkina Faso | Cabo Verde | Cameroon | Chad | Gambia | Ghana | Guinea | Liberia | Mali | Mauritania | Niger | Nigeria (26 states and FCT) | Senegal | Sierra Leone | Togo

Amid expanded analysis coverage, the region faces the highest numbers of people in CH Phase 3 or above in GRFC history

44.09M people or **11%** of the analysed population in CH Phase 3 or above, in 2023 in 15 countries

108.6M in 15 countries | 41.4M in 15 countries | 2.7M in 15 countries | 45 200 in 2 countries



All countries had 95–100 percent of their populations analysed except Cabo Verde (82%), Guinea (85%), Nigeria (26 states and the FCT) (91%) and Togo (73%).

Source: Cadre Harmonisé, November 2022 and March 2023.

Populations in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5)


About **45 200** people were projected to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in the region.

In June–August 2023, around **42 700** of them were in the Sahel and Boucle du Mouhoun region in **Burkina Faso**, where conflicts and insecurity severely impede the proper functioning of markets and prevent populations from adequately accessing food products. This number of people in CH Phase 5, representing the highest on record for the CH in Burkina Faso, has almost doubled since March–May 2023 (22 500) and far exceeds the 1 800 in this phase in October–December 2022.

The remaining **2 500** people projected to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) are in the Ménaka region in **Mali**, with conflict and high displacement levels at the root of these conditions. This represents the first time in the history of the CH that people have faced this most severe form of acute food insecurity in Mali.

MAP 2.3

Numbers of people in CH Phase 3 or above, 2023




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: Cadre Harmonisé, November 2022 and March 2023.

FIGURE 2.7

Share of analysed population by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023



CH

Phase 1 - None | Phase 2 - Stressed | Phase 3 - Crisis | Phase 4 - Emergency | Phase 5 - Catastrophe | Not analysed

This chart ranks countries from highest prevalence of analysed population in CH Phase 3 or above to lowest.

Source: Cadre Harmonisé, November 2022 and March 2023.

Fifteen countries with data by early August 2023

Of the 15 countries in this region that were selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2023, all have data available for 2023.

Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau are not included in this Mid-Year Update as they were not selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2023.

Acute food insecurity overview

The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 has increased for a fifth consecutive year, reaching about 44.1 million in 15 countries by mid-2023. This data is based on the March 2023 CH cycle for 12 countries (CILSS, March 2023) and the CH cycle of November 2022 for three countries – the Gambia, Liberia and Togo (CILSS, November 2022).

The number of people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) increased by 6.4 percent between

2022 (41.5 million) and 2023. At the same time, the analysed population increased by 16 percent. In Nigeria, the geographical coverage of the CH analysis expanded from 21 states and the FCT to 26 states and the FCT or from 72 percent to 91 percent of the population, while in Ghana the analysed population more than doubled from 44 percent to 100 percent. In terms of the prevalence of acute food and nutrition insecurity in these 15 countries, there was a modest decline, with 11.2 percent of the analysed population in CH Phase 3 or above in 2023, slightly down from 12.2 percent in 2022.

Of the 44.1 million people in CH Phase 3 or above, most (41.4 million) are in Crisis (CH Phase 3), 2.7 million are in Emergency (CH Phase 4) and 45 200 in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5), indicating a concerning situation rooted in lingering conflicts and worsening insecurity, soaring food prices and macroeconomic challenges through 2022 and 2023. Analyses at the country level are available in the GRFC 2023 *Rapport Régional pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest et le Sahel* (CILSS, FSIN & GNAFC, June 2023).

In five countries – Ghana, the Gambia, Nigeria, Liberia and Senegal – the number of people in CH Phase 3 or above increased between 2022 and 2023. In Ghana, the percentage of the population analysed increased from 44 percent to 100 percent and from 72 percent to 86 percent in Nigeria, driving most of the increase.

In ten countries – Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo – the number and percentage of people in CH Phase 3 or above decreased as a result of higher-than-average agricultural production that mitigated the effects of persisting high inflation, especially in coastal countries, and insecurity in Sahelian countries (CILSS, November 2022; CILSS, March 2023).

The largest declines in the prevalence of acute food insecurity occurred in Guinea and the Niger, while the largest decreases in the number of people in CH Phase 3 or above were registered in Guinea, Mali and the Niger.

Following a coup d'état in the Niger on 26 July 2023, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided on sanctions for commercial and financial transactions. A number of countries suspended cooperation and some organisations halted operations. Humanitarian assistance has continued in some areas but has become increasingly challenging. The coup could worsen insecurity across the country and aggravate already high acute food insecurity conditions.

Nine countries met the criteria to be considered major food crises in 2023: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone.

Drivers



Conflict/insecurity was a main driver of acute food insecurity, mainly in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria (26 states and the FCT). The spread of the Central Sahel insecurity crisis to northern areas of coastal countries, including Togo, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Benin (the latter two are not included in the Mid-Year Update), is concerning and represents a threat to food security in those areas.

In the first half of 2023, the number of violent events in the six countries most affected by conflict and insecurity was 9 percent higher than during the first half of 2022 (ACLEDA, July 2023). This is mainly due to the persistence of security crises in border areas, including the Lake Chad Basin and the Central Sahel, as well as conflict in northwest and southwest regions of Cameroon.

The insecurity continues to trigger large-scale internal and cross-border population displacements, and severely disrupt agricultural livelihoods, pastoral transhumance, markets and trade. By June 2023, 9.68 million people were displaced, of whom 7.8 million were internally displaced and 1.9 million were refugees and asylum seekers. This represents a 4 percent increase compared to 9.4 million people displaced by the end of 2022 (UNHCR, January 2023; UNHCR June 2023).

Poor security in the most severely conflict-affected areas continues to constrain humanitarian access in 2023, curtailing the delivery of assistance.




Economic shocks continue to be a main driver of acute food insecurity, mostly in the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, as well as in conflict-affected countries. Unsustainable debt levels and slow growth, in part due to the persistent effects of COVID-19 amid increasing uncertainty in global markets, have had a negative impact on national economies and have reduced the budgetary capacity for implementing social protection measures.

Inflation was persistently high in several countries in the region, notably in Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria, underpinned by significant depreciation of national currencies against the US dollar, high prices of fertilizers

FIGURE 2.8

Annual food inflation, June 2023



Data for Chad and Liberia refer to April 2023; all other data refer to June 2023. No recent data are available for Cameroon and Mali.

Source: WFP Economic Explorer, 2023.

and hydrocarbons on the world market, and the resulting higher transportation costs, as well as market disruptions in conflict-affected areas. The unification of the exchange rates and the removal of fuel subsidies in Nigeria in mid-June further drove inflation, which has been increasing steadily through 2023. As of June, the annual headline inflation rate was estimated at 22.8 percent while food inflation reached 25.25 percent (WFP, 2023).

Furthermore, the inflationary effects of these two measures in Nigeria are expected to drive price increases in neighbouring countries as the country is a key supplier of essential commodities in the region, including fuel and food.

Amid the general increase in the cost of food baskets, prices of staple cereals – mostly sorghum, millet and maize – followed mixed trends in the first six months

of 2023. Prices remained stable or declined in Burkina Faso, Liberia, the Niger and Togo, mostly underpinned by the improved supply in markets following good cereal harvests in late 2022 and early 2023. However, 20–60 percent year-on-year increases in cereal prices were registered in the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone (FAO-FPMA, June 2023; FAO, June 2023; FEWS NET Global Price Watch, July 2023).



Weather extremes are a potential additional factor driving acute food insecurity in 2023.

Regional weather forecasts indicate an overall favourable distribution of rains across the Sudanian and Sahelian zones for the 2023 rainy season with pockets of below-average rainfall in Sierra Leone, Liberia and southern Nigeria and a risk of flooding in riverine areas of northern Nigeria, Senegal, Northern Togo, the Niger and Burkina Faso (CILSS, June 2023).

This risk raises concerns following the flooding events during the 2022 rainy season, which disrupted transport, marketing activities and livelihoods and caused localized crop losses, limiting local food availability and access. By December 2022, floods had affected approximately 7.1 million people in 14 countries, particularly in Nigeria (26 states and the FCT), Chad, the Niger and Cameroon (OCHA, February 2023).

Nutrition overview

High levels of child wasting and maternal acute malnutrition are reported in nine countries with data for 2023: Burkina Faso, Chad, the Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. About 12.29 children under 5 years are estimated to be suffering from wasting in 2023, of whom 3.37 million are severely wasted.

An estimated 1.03 million pregnant and breastfeeding women have acute malnutrition in five of these countries where data are available: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria.

Asia


Afghanistan | Bangladesh | Pakistan (Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh) | Sri Lanka

Improvements in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, and expanded analysis coverage in Bangladesh and Pakistan

47.54M people or **34%** of the analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, in 2023 in four countries

43.63M of them are in three countries with IPC analyses

40.57M in 3 countries | 33.12M in 3 countries | 10.51M in 3 countries



Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023.

3.91M of them are in Sri Lanka with a WFP CARI analysis


Source: FAO/WFP, 2023.

Four countries in Asia with data by mid-2023

Out of the 12 countries in the region selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2023, seven were not included as they had data gaps or data that did not meet GRFC requirements: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Tajikistan and Tonga. This was still the case by early August 2023. No 2023 data were available for Myanmar.

MAP 2.5

Numbers of people in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2023



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023; FAO/WFP, 2023 (Sri Lanka).

Acute food insecurity overview

Around 47.5 million people or 34 percent of the analysed population are estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in four of the five countries that were included in the GRFC 2023. Over 90 percent of them are in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, which are among the countries with the highest number of people and prevalence of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent in 2023.

Direct comparison between the 2022 and 2023 analyses is not possible for **Bangladesh** or **Pakistan** due to increased analysis coverage in both countries.

No new data are available for **Myanmar** but intensifying conflict, soaring food prices and continued displacement mean that the food security situation could deteriorate in the second half of 2023 (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).


Four countries with new 2023 analyses (since March 2023)

Afghanistan

Afghanistan continued to be the largest food crisis in the region with the peak of acute food insecurity occurring between November 2022 and March 2023 – although the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) was around 13 percent lower than during the

FIGURE 2.11

Share of analysed population by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023



IPC
 Phase 1 - None | Phase 2 - Stressed | Phase 3 - Crisis
 Phase 4 - Emergency | Phase 5 - Catastrophe

WFP CARI
 Food secure + marginally food secure | Moderate + severe acute food insecurity

Not analysed

This chart ranks countries from highest prevalence of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent to lowest.

Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023; FAO/WFP, 2023 (Sri Lanka).

same period in 2021–2022 when 22.81 million people (55 percent of the population) were in these phases (IPC, January 2023; IPC, October 2021).

Around 19.9 million people or 46 percent of Afghanistan's population were in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including about 6.1 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) between November 2022 and March 2023, which is the lean season period in most areas.

New analyses in 2023 showed an improvement from April with 17.2 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, and 15.3 million in the post-harvest period of May–October. As per GRFC protocol the peak figure – that of November 2022–March 2023 – is reported.

Nevertheless, Afghanistan still faces a persisting and alarming acute food insecurity situation, underpinned by the impact of decades of conflict on livelihoods and reduced food availability during the winter lean season. Sustained high food prices, and ongoing macroeconomic and policy challenges have reduced income-generating opportunities and contributed to high unemployment.

Bangladesh

For Bangladesh, the GRFC 2023 used data from the Joint Response Plan on the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (IOM et al, March 2023), which analysed Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs) in camps and host communities in Cox’s Bazar, while this Mid-Year Update presents a new IPC analysis covering 15 of the country’s 64 districts and FDMNs, thus increasing the analysed population from 1.4 million to 38.2 million or 23 percent of the country’s total population.

The number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above is projected to increase from 8.9 million during March–April 2023 (24 percent of the analysed population) to 11.9 million (31 percent of the analysed population) during the lean season of May–September 2023 due in part to anticipated cyclones and consequent flooding. Out of over 2 million people in IPC Phase 4 from May–September 2023, around 239 500 are Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs) in Cox’s Bazar (IPC, June 2023).

Pakistan

In November 2023–January 2024, 11.81 million people are projected to be in IPC Phase 3 or above, corresponding to 32 percent of the analysed population (IPC, June 2023).¹ This is not comparable with the peak of 8.6 million in IPC Phase 3 or above during September–December 2022 as the number of rural districts analysed increased from 28 to 43, corresponding to an increase from 19.8 million to 36.7 million people analysed. However, looking at the same 16 districts covered by both analyses, the proportion of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased in four districts of Sindh and four of Balochistan, while it reduced in four districts of Sindh and three of Balochistan. It remained the same in Washuk compared to July 2022 (pre-flooding analysis) (IPC, December 2022; IPC, June 2023).

¹ The IPC analysis is pending Government approval.

Sri Lanka


During the February–March 2023 period, approximately 3.91 million people, or 17 percent of the national population, were estimated to face moderate acute food insecurity and around 10 000 people severe acute food insecurity, based on the WFP CARI methodology (FAO/WFP, May 2023). This is 2.4 million fewer people than during the May–June 2022 period when 6.3 million people or 28 percent of the population faced moderate or severe acute food insecurity (FAO/WFP, September 2022). The macroeconomic situation has improved in recent months with the annual headline inflation rate down from 67.4 percent in September 2022 to 6.3 percent in July 2023 (WFP Economic Explorer, August 2023), mainly driven by lower food prices and an increase in foreign exchange reserves. In addition, currency appreciation since March 2022 has strengthened capacities to import food (FAO/WFP, May 2023).

Drivers

Economic shocks were considered the primary driver of acute food insecurity in all four countries with 2023 data. High inflation rates and increases in the cost of fuel, fertilizer and food have reduced the purchasing power of households and weakened resilience to other food security shocks across Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (FAO/WFP, May 2023; HNO, January 2023; IPC, June 2023; IPC, June 2023). In Afghanistan, additional policies restricting women’s movement, on top of limitations to employment, constrains access to markets for female-headed

FIGURE 2.12

Annual food inflation, June 2023



Data for Afghanistan refer to May 2023; data for Pakistan and Bangladesh refer to June 2023; data for Sri Lanka refer to July 2023. Source: WFP Economic Explorer, 2023.

households with socio-cultural norms leading to a gender imbalance in food consumption (CARE, November 2022).

During the first half of 2023, food inflation rates increased in Pakistan and Bangladesh and followed an opposite trend in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka (WFP Economic Explorer). As of June 2023, Pakistan recorded the highest food inflation rate at 39 percent, followed by Bangladesh at 10 percent, while Afghanistan experienced food deflation for the second consecutive month at 6 percent in July 2023, following a 3 percent decline in May 2023 (WFP Economic Explorer). In Sri Lanka, the food inflation rate has fallen steadily after reaching a 95 percent peak in September 2022, to -1.4 percent in June 2023. In all countries inflation is having a disproportionately negative impact on the purchasing power of low-income groups, such as farmers, daily wage labourers, and groups reliant on government social safety nets (IPC, June 2023; FAO/WFP, May 2023; HNO, January 2023).

Currency depreciation in Pakistan is reducing imports of critical goods and food staples (IPC, June 2023). The macroeconomic crisis is eroding households’ ability to access food and agricultural inputs, while limiting the government’s ability to provide critical assistance.

Afghanistan’s economy is expected to see moderate GDP growth through 2023 following the late 2022 stabilization of the currency, but this forecast is contingent on negotiations between the de facto authorities and international donors (UNDP, April 2023). While wheat prices continue to decline from 2022 levels, agricultural yields are constrained by fertilizer prices that remain above two-year averages and a lack of certified seed inputs (FAO-GIEWS, June 2023).

Weather extremes Household recovery from the 2022 flooding continues to drive acute food insecurity in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Pakistan, flooding reduced wheat production in early 2023, including in Balochistan and Sindh provinces, which were still recovering from catastrophic flooding in 2022 (IPC, June 2023). Many of the more than 2 million people displaced by flooding in the northeast of Bangladesh remain vulnerable to further shocks during the 2023 cyclone season (IPC, June 2023). Already, Cyclone Mocha made landfall in Cox’s Bazar in May 2023,

destroying homes and key service provision facilities (UN, May 2023).

Afghanistan endured three consecutive years of La Niña-related drought (HNO, January 2023), which ended in March 2023. Below-average rainfall between October 2022 and April 2023 has had a negative impact on wheat and barley crop outputs, particularly in the north, west, and south (FAO-GIEWS, June 2023).

Conflict/insecurity In Afghanistan, pockets of violence persist in Panjshir, Samangan, and Sar-e-Pul provinces that threaten to spark new population displacements should conflict escalate (HNO, January 2023). The Interim Taliban Authority has issued numerous decrees and directives, strongly affecting the daily lives, livelihoods and human rights of Afghans, as well as the operating environment for humanitarian responders (ACAPS, June 2023). Two years since the political transition of August 2021 the engagement between the Taliban and the international community is at an impasse.

The humanitarian response in the FDMN refugee camps of Bangladesh continues to prioritize eventual reintegration in Myanmar, but the current security and political situation in Myanmar prevents the safe return of refugees (JRP, March 2023).

Crop pests The north and northeast of Afghanistan is still facing the consequences of the May 2023 Moroccan locust outbreak that has lowered wheat yields, a critical crop for household income and consumption, just as farmers have shifted towards greater wheat production in response to the Interim Taliban Authority’s (ITA) ban on poppy production (FAO-GIEWS, June 2023).

Nutrition overview

Malnutrition data for 2023 are only available for Afghanistan where a deterioration of the acute malnutrition situation is projected (IPC AMN, January 2023), with 3.2 million children under 5 years estimated to be suffering from wasting in 2023, of whom nearly 875 000 are estimated to be severely wasted. An estimated 804 400 pregnant and breastfeeding women are acutely malnourished in 2023.


Latin America and the Caribbean

Dominican Republic | El Salvador | Guatemala | Haiti | Honduras | Nicaragua

A slight regional decline in populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity since 2022 though Haiti has persistently high numbers


 Up to **13.63M** people or **22%** of the analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above in 2023 in six countries

13.13M of them are in **four** countries with IPC analyses



Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023.

0.2–0.5M of them are in **two** countries with FEWS NET analyses


 **Nicaragua and El Salvador** (each **0.1–0.25M**)

Source: FEWS NET, 2023.

Six countries with data by early August 2023

Out of 11 countries selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2023, five had data gaps/data not meeting GRFC partner consensus by early August 2023: Colombia (residents, refugees and migrants), Cuba, Ecuador (residents, refugees and migrants), Peru (residents, refugees and migrants) and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

No populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in mid-2023

 In **Haiti**, while about 19 200 people were in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in September 2022–February 2023, none were in this phase during the March–June 2023 peak period.

Catastrophic conditions were projected in early 2023 in the Cité Soleil commune of the capital Port-au-Prince, following three successive years of deteriorating acute food insecurity conditions. Gang violence and associated insecurity constrained access to essential services, including markets, lowered supplies of food and fuel and reduced income-generating activities, which have constrained food access and availability.

The shift of populations from Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) to lower phases reflects improved security conditions and sustained humanitarian assistance that have enhanced food access and availability (IPC, March 2023).

Acute food insecurity overview

The number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in Latin America and the Caribbean was projected to decline overall in 2023, with a marginal increase in Haiti and a decrease in Guatemala and Honduras.

According to data available by early August 2023, up to 13.6 million people are estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 or above in 2023 in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua. All except

MAP 2.4

Numbers of people in IPC Phase 3 or above, 2023




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: IPC TWGs, FEWS NET (Nicaragua and El Salvador).

FIGURE 2.9

Share of analysed population by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023



This chart ranks countries from highest prevalence of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above to lowest.

Source: IPC TWGs, FEWS NET (Nicaragua and El Salvador).

Nicaragua and El Salvador met the criteria for being considered major food crises with at least 1 million people or 20 percent of their country population in IPC Phase 3 or above. In the four countries with comparable IPC 2022 and 2023 data, the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above decreased slightly from 13.5 million in 2022 to 13.1 million in 2023, primarily driven by declines in Guatemala and Honduras. The prevalence of the analysed population in these phases decreased marginally from 28 percent to 27 percent.

Since the release of the GRFC 2023 in May, new data for 2023 became available for **Guatemala** (IPC) and in **El Salvador**, the data source changed from IPC to a FEWS NET remote estimate. In the other four countries – the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua – the data included in this Mid-Year Update are estimates and projections that were included in the GRFC 2023.

In **Haiti**, the number of people projected to be in IPC Phase 3 or above increased to 4.9 million in March–June

2023, 4 percent more than the 2022 peak (September 2022–February 2023). The percentage of the analysed population in these phases increased marginally from 48 percent to 49 percent. The peak estimate for 2023 includes 1.8 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), or 18 percent of the analysed population, reflecting persisting insecurity and gang violence, coupled with high food prices, poor economic activity and reduced agricultural production underpinned by the impact of weather extremes (IPC, March 2023). Despite the increase in the magnitude of the food crisis, populations in Port-au-Prince are no longer in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (IPC, March 2023).

The population in IPC Phase 3 or above was projected to decline in **Honduras** from 2.6 million people during the peak of 2022 to 2.4 million during June–August 2023, with the prevalence declining from 28 percent to 25 percent (IPC, March 2023). The decline mainly reflects slight improvements in economic activities in the tourism, textile and agricultural sectors.

In the **Dominican Republic**, the acute food insecurity projection straddled 2022 and 2023 and thus was the same for both years (IPC, January 2023), with the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above estimated at 1.6 million (15 percent of the analysed population), including 142 500 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (1 percent). This figure was projected to decrease to 1.2 million (11 percent of the analysed population) in March–June 2023, as a result of increased seasonal farm labour opportunities and recoveries in the tourism and agricultural sectors.

In **Nicaragua**, between 100 000 and 250 000 people were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity from June–August 2023, reflecting persistent economic difficulties and the lingering effects of weather shocks (FEWS NET, January 2023). In 2022, about 200 000 people were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity according to a FEWS NET analysis.

Two countries with new 2023 analyses (since March 2023)

Guatemala


The new IPC analysis for Guatemala indicates a peak of acute food insecurity during the June–August 2023 period, which covers the last months of the country's lean season. According to this analysis, about 4.3 million people or 24 percent of the analysed population were estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 or above, representing a slight decline from 4.6 million people or 26 percent of the analysed population estimated in June–September 2022. In spite of this moderate improvement, the levels of acute food insecurity are high, mostly reflecting high food prices and poor income-earning opportunities for agricultural wage earners, which are compounding the seasonal effects of dwindling household food stocks (IPC, June 2023).

El Salvador

In El Salvador, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in June–December 2023, based on a remote FEWS NET estimate was projected to be between 100 000 and 250 000 (FEWS NET, June 2023). These estimates are not comparable to 2022 due to the change in data source and are significantly lower.

FIGURE 2.10

Annual food inflation, June 2023



Data for Haiti refer to May 2023; all other data refer to June 2023.
Source: WFP Economic Explorer, 2023.

Drivers



Economic shocks were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua where low-income households that rely on the informal sector and daily wages continued to be negatively impacted by the lingering economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, high uncertainty on global food commodity markets and severe weather hazards.

They were also a contributory factor to acute food insecurity in Haiti where reduced income opportunities have eroded households' purchasing power amid increasing macroeconomic challenges and significant disruptions to economic activity related to insecurity.

According to the latest available data, annual food inflation was particularly high in Haiti, estimated at 45.8 percent in May 2023, while in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua it ranged between 7 and 15 percent in June 2023, limiting economic access to food. In the Dominican Republic, food inflation was the lowest at 5.5 percent in June 2023, reflecting sustained declines in food prices since the beginning of 2023. High reliance on imports of food, fertilizers and fuel combined with sustained currency depreciation, mainly in Haiti, have added further upward pressure on food prices.



Conflict/insecurity was the main driver of acute food insecurity in Haiti. Increasing political instability, economic hardship, reduced agricultural production and social tensions continue to constrain food access and availability and led to heightened unrest and conflict. In 2022, gang violence reached extremely high levels especially in urban areas, disrupting markets and the movement of people and goods and severely hindering economic activity. This situation has continued through 2023 and has resulted in poor market supplies and shortages of essential commodities, including fuel, which also contributed to sharp increases in food prices (IPC, March 2023).



Weather extremes Cereal production in 2023 is expected to be average or below-average in several countries of the region, including Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Haiti. This is due to constrained access and availability of agricultural inputs and hot and dry conditions between March and June 2023, which are foreseen to result in both low plantings and yields (FEWS NET, June 2023).

According to weather forecasts, below-average precipitation associated with the El Niño event are likely to persist in the third quarter of 2023 over northern Guatemala, eastern Honduras and most of Nicaragua.

The dry conditions, particularly in areas of the Dry Corridor in El Salvador and Honduras, are expected to extend the lean season by up to one month and lead to localized production shortfalls, thus reducing household food stocks (FEWS NET, June 2023).

In Haiti, torrential rains in early June triggered flooding and landslides across the country affecting about 450 000 households (OCHA, June 2023). For the July–September period, rainfall forecasts indicate average to above-average precipitation, which could cause further flooding and disrupt livelihoods in Haiti (JRC ASAP, July 2023).

The 2023 Atlantic hurricane season is forecast to be near average, with high probabilities of one to four major hurricanes (above category 3) developing between June and November (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023).

Nutrition overview

Lack of data continues to impede a comprehensive assessment of nutrition in the region amid growing concerns about increasing cases of wasted children – mostly among refugees and migrants.

Migrant populations face elevated levels of acute food insecurity, challenges caring for young children, and limited access to health services, all of which contribute to child wasting.

Middle East and North Africa

Jordan (Syrian refugees) | Lebanon (Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees) | Yemen

High proportions of analysed populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, particularly among displaced populations

 Up to **20.71M** people or **54%** of the analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 in three countries

2.26M of them are in one country* with an IPC analysis



* Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees.
Source: IPC TWG (Lebanon), 2022.

 **0.45M** of them are in Jordan with a WFP CARI analysis


Source: FAO/WFP, 2023.

 **17.0–17.99M** of them are in Yemen with a FEWS NET analysis

Source: FEWS NET, 2023.

MAP 2.6


Numbers of people in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent, 2022



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Source: IPC TWG, 2022; WFP CARI, 2023 (Jordan (Syrian refugees)); FEWS NET, 2023 (Yemen).

FIGURE 2.13

Share of analysed population by phase of acute food insecurity, 2023



IPC
 Phase 1 - None Phase 2 - Stressed Phase 3 - Crisis
 Phase 4 - Emergency Phase 5 - Catastrophe Not analysed

WFP CARI
 Food secure + marginally food secure Moderate + severe acute food insecurity

FEWS NET
 Phase 1+2- None + Stressed Phase 3+ - Crisis or worse

This chart ranks countries from highest prevalence of analysed population in IPC Phase 3 or above to lowest.

Source: IPC TWG, 2022; WFP CARI, 2023 (Jordan (Syrian refugees)); FEWS NET, 2023 (Yemen).

The number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased by 15 percent between 2022 and 2023.

Conversely, the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan facing high levels of acute food insecurity declined by 17 percent between the two years.

No new data were available for eight food crises in the region including two GRFC 2023 major food crises –

Three countries with data by early August 2023

Of the 11 countries/territories in the MENA region that were selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2023, only three have new data available for 2023: Jordan (refugees), Lebanon (residents and Syrian refugees) and Yemen. For Algeria (Sahrawi refugees), Egypt (refugees), Iran (refugees), Iraq (IDPs and returnees), Libya, Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye (refugees), there were no new analyses or projections covering 2023.

Acute food insecurity overview

Up to 20.7 million people or 54 percent of the analysed population face high levels of acute food insecurity in three countries with available data by early August 2023.

Only two countries – Jordan (Syrian refugees) and Yemen – have new analyses since publication of the GRFC 2023. In Yemen the analysis is not comparable due to a change in data source.

In the GRFC 2023, it was projected that the number of Lebanese residents in IPC Phase 3 or above would increase from 1.3 million (33 percent of residents) in September–December 2022 to 1.5 million in January–April 2023 (38 percent of residents) as a result of the deteriorating economic situation. The number of Syrian refugees in IPC Phase 3 or above was projected to increase from 0.7 million (46 percent of refugees) to 0.8 million (53 percent of refugees) (IPC, December 2022).

Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic – where 1.5 million and 12.1 million people respectively faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2022.

Two countries with new 2023 analyses (since March 2023)

Jordan

A WFP CARI analysis of Syrian refugees in Jordan found that 453 900 faced high acute food insecurity, representing 62 percent of the analysed population over the January to March period in 2023. Although food security overall improved compared to the previous year, in 2023 certain groups, such as female-headed households, unemployed people, and the disabled have become more vulnerable. Debt levels have risen as refugees borrow to cover their basic food expenses. Refugees in camps remain dependent on assistance and work opportunities remain limited, with 55 percent of refugees in host communities and 70 percent in camps unemployed (WFP, June 2023).

Yemen

A FEWS NET analysis projected 17 to 17.99 million people to be in IPC Phase 3 or above in December 2023, corresponding to 50–55 percent of the population. This is the same as FEWS NET estimated for July 2023, but higher than the five-year average (FEWS NET, July 2023). While seasonal variations in food and income in the lead-up to the main harvest between October and December 2023 are expected, limited income-generating opportunities and elevated food prices will continue to result in outcomes associated with widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. The Ma'rib City district is likely to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) due to its large displaced population (FEWS NET, June 2023).

Drivers



Conflict/insecurity remained the primary driver of acute food insecurity in Yemen and for forcibly displaced populations in Jordan.

Conflict has been the primary driver of acute food insecurity across Yemen since 2015, but the April 2022 UN-brokered truce – despite not being renewed in October 2022 – has reduced its impact in most areas

except along the frontlines (IPC, June 2023). Where IDPs are able to return to their place of origin there has been an intensification of disputes over natural resources, such as land and water (ACAPS, June 2023).

Protracted conflict and insecurity are expected to continue to drive food insecurity and displacement in the Syrian Arab Republic and Palestine. In the latter territory an escalation of hostilities in May resulted in casualties, displacement and restrictions in the movement of people and goods.



Economic shocks In countries experiencing difficult socioeconomic circumstances due to conflicts and/or economic crises, including Lebanon and Yemen, farmers' access to inputs remains constrained by the lack of liquidity and high prices of imported inputs, factors that are curtailing productive capacities and yield potentials (FAO-GIEWS, July 2023). The region as a whole continues to be affected by high costs of food and inputs.

In Lebanon, where economic shocks are the main driver of acute food insecurity, inflation remained high at 254 percent as of June 2023. Food inflation has reached even higher rates of 280 percent as of June 2023 (WFP Economic Explorer).

Populations in Yemen have continued to face extremely challenging economic conditions, with continued challenges to purchasing power, limited access to basic services and increased selling of productive assets and household indebtedness (ACAPS, May 2023).

Refugee populations in Jordan face severe food-access constraints due to high levels of indebtedness and unemployment.

FIGURE 2.14

Annual food inflation, June 2023



No recent food inflation data is available for Yemen.
Source: WFP Economic Explorer, 2023.



© WFP/MEHDI RAHMAN

Despite the April 2022 truce, humanitarian needs are worsening across Yemen, especially for the 2.3 million IDPs – mainly women and children – due to a weakened economy, rains and flooding, drought and fuel shortages.



Weather extremes were not considered a primary driver of acute food insecurity in the region where agricultural production is often limited by harsh agroecological conditions, but they were a contributor in all countries/territories. In Yemen, heavy rains resulted in flooding in some parts of the country in May, but contributed to favourable conditions for planting and vegetation in other areas, particularly in the highlands (FAO, May 2023).



Natural disasters The February 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye and the Syrian Arab Republic are expected to affect food security in those countries through 2023.

Nutrition overview

Malnutrition data for 2023 in the region are only available for Yemen where a partial analysis covering areas under the control of the government in the southwest, centre and east of the country indicate a deterioration (IPC AMN, June 2023). In these areas, about 456 000 children under 5 years are estimated to be suffering from wasting in 2023, of whom nearly 98 000 are estimated to be severely wasted.

An estimated 260 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women are acutely malnourished in 2023 in Yemen.



APPENDICES

TABLE A.1 (PAGE 1 OF 5)

Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2021–2023

Highest numbers of acutely food-insecure people in 2021, 2022 and projected highest numbers for 2023.

Countries/territories	USUAL PERIOD OF PEAK NEED	2021 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people (projected)					
		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)	
						PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)
Refugees/migrant populations are indicated in blue																			
Afghanistan	Jan–Apr	IPC	Nov 2021–Mar 2022	41.7 100%	Entire country	12.5 30%	22.8* 55%	IPC	Nov 2022–Mar 2023	43.1 100%	Entire country	14.3 33%	19.9* 46%	IPC	Nov 2022–Mar 2023	43.1 100%	Entire country	14.3 33%	19.9* 46%
Algeria (Sahrawi refugees)	Jan–Dec	Data not meeting GRFC requirements						WFP	Oct 2022	0.2 76%	WFP-assisted Sahrawi refugees	N/A	0.1 74%	Data gap					
Angola	Jan–Mar	IPC	Oct 2021–Mar 2022	32.1 9%	17 rural municipalities in 3 south-western provinces	0.7 25%	1.6* 58%	IPC	Oct 2021–Mar 2022	32.1 9%	17 rural municipalities in 3 southwestern provinces	0.7 25%	1.6* 58%	FEWS NET	Dec 2023	33.0 100%	Entire country	N/A	1–1.5 <5%
Bangladesh †	Jan–Dec (refugees) Varies (hosts)	JRP (REVA)	Oct–Nov 2021	164.7 1%	Rohingya refugees and host populations in Ukhiya and Teknaf upazilas of Cox’s Bazar District	N/A	1.3 84%	JRP (REVA)	Jan–Dec 2022	164.7 1%	Rohingya refugees and host populations in Cox’s Bazar	N/A	1.3 89%	IPC	May–Sep 2023	165.2 23%	15 districts, the Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN) and host communities in Cox Bazar	12.9 34%	11.9* 31%
Burkina Faso	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	22.0 98%	Entire country	4.8 22%	2.9* 13%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	21.9 97%	Entire country	5.3 25%	3.5* 16%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	22.3 100%	Entire country	5.1 23%	3.4** 15%
Burundi	Apr–May	IPC	Apr–May 2021	12.5 94%	Entire country	5.0 43%	1.6* 14%	IPC	Oct–Dec 2022	12.0 100%	Entire country	3.7 30%	1.4* 12%	IPC	Apr–May 2023	12.3 100%	Entire country	5.5 44%	2.3* 19%
Cabo Verde	Jun–Aug	Data gap						CH	Jun–Aug 2022	0.5 100%	Entire country	0.1 29%	0.05* 10%	CH	Mar–May 2023	0.6 82%	Entire country	0.1 17%	0.04* 9%
Cameroon	Mar–May	CH	Mar–May 2021	25.9 100%	Entire country	5.8 23%	2.6* 10%	CH	Oct–Dec 2022	27.2 100%	Entire country	6.8 25%	3.6* 13%	CH	Mar–May 2023	28.5 95%	Entire country	6.1 22%	3.0* 11%
Central African Republic	May–Aug	IPC	Apr–Aug 2021	4.9 100%	Entire country	1.6 33%	2.3* 47%	IPC	Sep 2022–Mar 2023	6.1 100%	Entire country	2.0 33%	2.7* †† 44%	IPC	Sep 2022–Mar 2023	6.1 100%	Entire country	2.0 33%	2.7* †† 44%
Chad	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	16.7 92%	Entire country, except N’Djamena	3.3 22%	1.8* 12%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	16.8 94%	Entire country, excluding N’Djamena	4.0 25%	2.1* 13%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	16.2 100%	Entire country	3.6 22%	1.9* 11%
Colombia (refugees and migrants)	Jan–Dec	Data not meeting GRFC requirements						WFP	Jun–Aug 2022	4.56 100%	Refugees and migrants	N/A	2.88 62%	Data gap					
Congo (refugees)	Jan–Dec	Data not meeting GRFC requirements						WFP	Aug–Sep 2022	0.06 100%	Refugees and asylum-seekers	N/A	0.04 65%	Data gap					
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Varies by area/region	IPC	Feb–Jul 2021	105.0 91%	133 territories and 37 urban areas	40.8 42%	27.3* 28%	IPC	Jul–Dec 2022	109.6 94%	26 provinces comprising 138 rural areas and 47 urban areas (including 24 in Kinshasa)	44.9 44%	26.4* 26%	IPC	Jan–Jun 2023	109.6 94%	26 provinces comprising 138 rural areas and 47 urban areas (including 24 in Kinshasa)	46.8 45%	25.8* 25%
Djibouti	Jun–Sep	IPC	Jan–Aug 2021	1.1 100%	Entire country	0.4 35%	0.2* 17%	IPC	Jul 2022–Dec 2022	1.2 100%	Entire country	0.4 35%	0.2* 16%	IPC	Jul–Dec 2023	1.2 100%	Entire country	0.4 34%	0.3* 24%

* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). ** The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5). † The 2021 and 2022 estimates are based on the ENA methodology, for which the GRFC TWG has identified comparability challenges with IPC/CH estimates (see Technical Notes). †† This analysis is pending Government approval.

TABLE A.1 (PAGE 2 OF 5)

Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2021–2023

Highest numbers of acutely food-insecure people in 2021, 2022 and projected highest numbers for 2023.

Countries/territories	USUAL PERIOD OF PEAK NEED	2021 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people (projected)					
		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)	
						PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)
Refugees/migrant populations are indicated in blue																			
Dominican Republic	Jan–Feb	Not included in GRFC 2022						IPC	Oct 2022–Feb 2023	10.6 100%	Entire country	3.4 32%	1.6* 15%	IPC	Oct 2022–Feb 2023	10.6 100%	Entire country	3.4 32%	1.6* 15%
Ecuador (refugees and migrants)	Jan–Dec	Data not meeting GRFC requirements						WFP	Jul–Aug 2022	0.5 100%	Refugees and migrants	N/A	0.3 60%	Data gap					
Egypt (Syrian refugees)	Jan–Dec	WFP	Mar 2021	0.1 63%	WFP-assisted refugees from Syrian Arab Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen and Iraq	N/A	0.04 27%	Data not meeting GRFC requirements						Data gap					
El Salvador	Jun–Aug	IPC	Mar–May 2021	6.8 99%	Entire country	2.4 36%	1.0* 15%	IPC	Mar–May 2022	6.3 100%	Entire country	3.3 52%	0.9* 14%	FEWS NET	Jun 2023	6.6 100%	Entire country	N/A	0.1–0.25 4%
Eswatini	Jan–Mar	IPC	Jan–Mar 2021	1.2 97%	Entire country	0.4 38%	0.3* 30%	IPC	Dec 2021–Mar 2022	1.2 100%	Entire country	0.4 32%	0.3* 29%	IPC	Oct 2022–Mar 2023	1.2 99%	Entire country	0.4 37%	0.3* 22%
Ethiopia	Feb–Jun	IPC	May–Jun 2021	115.0 49%	Belg and Meher-dependent area	17.2 31%	16.8** 30%	HRP	Jun–Jul 2022	115.0 100%	Entire country	N/A	23.6 21%	FEWS NET	Jul 2023	126.5 100%	Entire country	N/A	19.0–20.0* 16%
Gambia	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	2.5 97%	Entire country	0.5 20%	0.1 5%	CH	Oct–Dec 2022	2.4 100%	Entire country	0.6 24%	0.2* 8%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	2.4 100%	Entire country	0.8 32%	0.3* 13%
Ghana	Varies by area/region	Not included in GRFC 2022						CH	Oct–Dec 2022	30.8 44%	120 districts	2.6 19%	0.8* 6%	CH	Mar–May 2023	32.7 100%	Entire country	4.1 13%	1.5* 4%
Guatemala	Jun–Aug	IPC	Nov 2020–Mar 2021	16.9 100%	Entire country	6.7 40%	3.7* 23%	IPC	Jun–Sep 2022	17.4 100%	Entire country	7.1 41%	4.6* 26%	IPC	Jun–Aug 2023	17.6 100%	Entire country	6.3 36%	4.3* 24%
Guinea	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	13.3 83%	Entire country, excluding Conakry	2.2 20%	0.7 6%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	13.3 84%	Entire country, excluding Conakry	3.8 34%	1.2* 11%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	13.5 85%	Entire country, excluding Conakry	2.6 23%	0.7* 6%
Haiti	Mar–Jun	IPC	Mar–Jun 2021	10.9 87%	Rural and urban areas, excluding Villes de Gonaïves	2.8 29%	4.4* 46%	IPC	Sep 2022–Feb 2023	10.9 91%	All rural areas and nine urban areas	2.8 28%	4.7** 48%	IPC	Mar–Jun 2023	10.9 91%	All rural areas and nine urban areas	2.7 27%	4.9* 49%
Honduras	Jun–Aug	IPC	Jul–Sep 2021	9.3 100%	Entire country	3.5 38%	3.3* 35%	IPC	Jun–Aug 2022	9.6 100%	Entire country	3.7 39%	2.6* 28%	IPC	Jun–Aug 2023	9.7 100%	Entire country	3.4 35%	2.4* 25%

* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). ** The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5). Note: The IPC estimates for Ethiopia in May–June 2021 presented in this table reflect the merger of the October 2020 and May 2021 IPC analysis results. The Government of Ethiopia has not endorsed the May 2021 IPC analysis.

TABLE A.1 (PAGE 3 OF 5)

Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2021–2023

Highest numbers of acutely food-insecure people in 2021, 2022 and projected highest numbers for 2023.

Countries/territories	USUAL PERIOD OF PEAK NEED	2021 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people (projected)					
		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)	
						PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)
Refugees/migrant populations are indicated in blue																			
Iraq	No typical lean season	HNO	Jul–Aug 2021	41.2 15%	IDPs and returnees	N/A	0.6 10%	HNO	Jun–Aug 2022	41.2 15%	IDPs and returnees	N/A	0.2 3%	Data gap					
Jordan (Syrian refugees)	Jan–Dec	WFP	Sep 2021	0.7 100%	Syrian refugees in host communities and camps	N/A	0.1 22%	WFP	Jul–Sep 2022	0.7 100%	Syrian refugees in host communities and camps	N/A	0.5 82%	WFP	Jan–Mar 2023	0.7 100%	Syrian refugees in camps and all refugees in urban settings	N/A	0.5 62%
Kenya	Mar–Apr	IPC	Nov 2021–Jan 2022	55.0 28%	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (rural)	5.2 35%	2.4* 16%	IPC	Oct–Dec 2022	55.0 27%	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (rural)	5.1 34%	4.4* 29%	IPC	Mar–Jun 2023	51.5 32%	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (rural)	5.9 36%	5.4* 32%
Lebanon (resident population)	No typical lean season	Data not meeting GRFC requirements						IPC	Sep–Dec 2022	4.3 90%	Entire country	1.8 46%	1.3* 33%	IPC	Jan–Apr 2023	4.3 90%	Entire country	1.6 42%	1.5* 38%
Lebanon (Syrian refugees)	Jan–Dec	VASyR	Jun–Jul 2021	1.5 100%	Syrian refugee population	N/A	0.7 49%	IPC	Sep–Dec 2022	1.5 100%	Syrian refugees	0.6 42%	0.7* 46%	IPC	Jan–Apr 2023	1.5 100%	Syrian refugees	0.5 35%	0.8* 53%
Lesotho	Jan–Mar	IPC	Oct 2020–Mar 2021	2.0 73%	Rural population	0.5 33%	0.6* 40%	IPC	Jan–Mar 2022	2.1 70%	Rural population	0.5 36%	0.3* 23%	IPC	Oct 2022–Mar 2023	2.1 71%	Rural population	0.5 34%	0.3 22%
Liberia	Oct–Dec	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	5.2 91%	Entire country	1.5 32%	0.9* 20%	CH	Oct–Dec 2022	4.8 100%	Entire country	1.0 21%	0.4* 8%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	4.8 100%	Entire country	1.4 29%	0.5* 11%
Libya	No typical lean season	HNO	Jun–Aug 2021	8.2 100%	Entire country	N/A	0.5 6%	HNO	Jun–Aug 2022	8.2 19%	IDPs, returnees, refugees and migrants	N/A	0.3 19%	Data gap					
Madagascar	Jan–Mar	IPC	Nov–Dec 2021	27.9 16%	Grand Sud and Est	1.8 41%	1.6* 37%	IPC	Nov 2022–Mar 2023	29.0 21%	Grand Sud and Est	2.5 40%	2.2* 36%	IPC	Nov 2022–Mar 2023	29.0 21%	Grand Sud and Est	2.5 40%	2.2* 36%
Malawi	Jan–Mar	IPC	Jan–Mar 2021	19.7 90%	Entire country (rural and urban)	6.3 35%	2.6* 15%	IPC	Oct 2022–Mar 2023	19.3 100%	Entire country	6.7 35%	3.8 20%	IPC	Oct 2022–Mar 2023	19.3 100%	Entire country	6.7 35%	3.8 20%
Mali	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	21.1 100%	Entire country	4.1 19%	1.3* 6%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	21.7 100%	Entire country	4.4 20%	1.8* 8%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	22.3 100%	Entire country	4.1 18%	1.3** 6%
Mauritania	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	4.3 100%	Entire country	0.9 21%	0.5* 11%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	4.4 100%	Entire country	1.4 33%	0.9* 20%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	3.5 100%	Entire country	0.8 23%	0.5* 13%
Mozambique	Jan–Mar	IPC	Jan–Mar 2021	30.1 60%	Part of the country (rural and urban areas)	8.4 46%	2.9* 16%	IPC	Nov 2022–Mar 2023	32.0 100%	Entire country	13.0 40%	3.1* 10%	IPC	Nov 2022–Mar 2023	32.0 100%	Entire country	13.0 40%	3.1* 10%
Myanmar	Sep–Oct	Data not meeting GRFC requirements						HNO	Jan–Dec 2022	56.0 100%	Entire country	N/A	15.2 27%	Data gap					

* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). ** The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5).

TABLE A.1 (PAGE 4 OF 5)

Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2021–2023

Highest numbers of acutely food-insecure people in 2021, 2022 and projected highest numbers for 2023.

Countries/territories	2021 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people							2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people					2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people (projected)						
	USUAL PERIOD OF PEAK NEED	SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)	
						PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)
Refugees/migrant populations are indicated in blue																			
Namibia	Jan–Mar	IPC	Dec 2021–Mar 2022	2.6 100%	Entire country	0.8 33%	0.8* 30%	IPC	Dec 2021–Mar 2022	2.6 100%	Entire country	0.8 33%	0.8* 30%	IPC	Jan–Mar 2023	2.6 100%	Entire country	0.9 35%	0.4* 15%
Nicaragua	Jul–Aug	FEWS NET	Jul–Aug 2021	6.2 100%	Entire country	N/A	0.4 6%	FEWS NET	Jun–Aug 2022	6.3 100%	Entire country	N/A	0.2 3%	FEWS NET	Jun–Aug 2023	6.3 100%	Entire country	N/A	0.1–0.25 2–4%
Niger	Jun–Aug	CH	Oct–Dec 2021	24.9 100%	Entire country	5.8 23%	2.6* 10%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	24.9 100%	Entire country	7.3 29%	4.4* 18%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	25.9 100%	Entire country	7.3 28%	3.3* 13%
Nigeria	Jun–Aug	CH	Oct–Dec 2021	219.5 73%	21 states and Federal Capital Territory	35.0 22%	12.9* 8%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	219.5 72%	21 states and Federal Capital Territory	40.8 26%	19.5* 12%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	213.4 91%	26 states and Federal Capital Territory	64.0 33%	24.9* 13%
Pakistan	Jun–Aug	IPC	Oct 2021–Mar/Apr 2022	215.3 9%	Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh	6.4 35%	4.7* 25%	IPC	Sep–Dec 2022	215.3 9%	Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh	6.2 32%	8.6* 43%	IPC	Nov 2023–Jan 2024	224.8 16%	Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh	13.4 36%	11.8*†† 32%
Palestine	No typical lean season	SEFSec	Dec 2020–Jan 2021	5.1 100%	Entire territory	N/A	1.8 35%	HNO	May–Jul 2022	5.5 100%	Entire territory	N/A	1.5 28%	Data gap					
Rwanda (refugees)	Jan–Dec	WFP	Jan–Dec 2021	0.1 100%	Refugee population	N/A	0.04 32%	Data not meeting GRFC requirements					Data gap						
Senegal	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	17.1 100%	Entire country	3.1 18%	0.5* 3%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	17.3 100%	Entire country	3.9 22%	0.9* 5%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	17.9 100%	Entire country	4.4 24%	1.3* 7%
Sierra Leone	Jun–Aug	CH	Jun–Aug 2021	8.5 96%	Entire country	2.8 35%	1.8* 22%	CH	Jun–Aug 2022	8.6 100%	Entire country	3.6 42%	1.6* 19%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	7.5 100%	Entire country	2.9 39%	1.2* 16%
Somalia	Feb–Apr	IPC	Oct–Dec 2021	15.7 100%	Entire country	3.7 24%	3.5* 22%	IPC	Oct–Dec 2022	17.0 100%	Entire country	3.1 18%	5.6** 33%	IPC	Apr–Jun 2023	17.0 100%	Entire country	3.3 19%	6.6** 39%
South Sudan	May–Jul	IPC	Apr–Jul 2021	12.1 100%	Entire country	3.1 26%	7.2** 60%	IPC	Apr–Jul 2022	12.4 100%	Entire country	2.9 23%	7.7** 63%	IPC	Apr–Jul 2023	12.4 100%	Entire country	3.1 25%	7.8** 63%
Sri Lanka		Data not meeting GRFC requirements						CFSAM	May–Jun 2022	22.2 100%	Entire country	N/A	6.3* 28%	CFSAM	Feb–Mar 2023	22.6 100%	Entire country	N/A	3.9 17%
Sudan	Oct–Jan	IPC	Jun–Sep 2021	46.8 100%	Entire country excluding Abyei and Al Tina	16.5 35%	9.8* 21%	IPC	Jun–Sep 2022	47.9 100%	Entire country	17.6 37%	11.7* 24%	IPC	Jul–Sep 2023	48.6 100%	Entire country	17.1 35%	20.3* 42%
Syrian Arab Republic	No typical lean season	HNO	Oct–Nov 2021	21.7 100%	Entire country	N/A	12.0 55%	HNO		22.1 100%	Entire country	N/A	12.1 55%	Data gap					
Togo	Jun–Aug	Not included in GRFC 2022						CH	Oct–Dec 2022	8.3 73%	Entire country, excluding 3 prefectures	1.4 23%	0.6* 9%	CH	Jun–Aug 2023	8.3 73%	Entire country, excluding 3 prefectures	1.3 22%	0.5* 8%
Uganda	May–Jul	FEWS NET	May–Jul 2021	45.7 100%	Entire country	N/A	2.2 5%	FEWS NET	Jun–Aug 2022	44.2 100%	Entire country	N/A	2.3 5%	FEWS NET	Mar–May 2023	45.6 100%	Entire country	N/A	2.0–2.5 4–5%

* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). ** The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5). †† IPC analysis pending Government approval.

TABLE A.1 (PAGE 5 OF 5)

Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2021–2023

Highest numbers of acutely food-insecure people in 2021, 2022 and projected highest numbers for 2023.

Countries/territories		2021 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2022 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people						2023 HIGHEST NUMBERS of acutely food-insecure people (projected)						
		USUAL PERIOD OF PEAK NEED	SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)		SOURCE	TIME PERIOD COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS	TOTAL POPULATION OF COUNTRY OR REGISTERED REFUGEES (MILLIONS) POPULATION ANALYSED (PERCENTAGE)	AREA/POPULATION ANALYSED	POPULATION IN IPC/CH PHASES (OR EQUIVALENT)	
						PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)						PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)					PHASE 2 (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)	PHASE 3 OR ABOVE (MILLIONS) (PERCENTAGE)
Refugees/migrant populations are indicated in blue																				
Ukraine	Dec–Mar	HNO	Oct–Nov 2021	41.3 15%	Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and IDP population	N/A	0.4 6%	REACH		35.6 100%	Entire country	N/A	8.9 25%	Data gap						
United Republic of Tanzania	Mar–Apr	IPC	Nov 2021–Apr 2022	57.6 6%	14 councils	0.8 23%	0.4* 13%	IPC	Oct 2022–Feb 2023	61.7 17%	28 councils and Zanzibar	3.3 31%	1.1* 10%	IPC	Oct 2022–Feb 2023	61.7 17%	28 councils and Zanzibar	3.3 31%	1.1* 10%	
Yemen	Jul–Sep	IPC	Jan–Jun 2021	30.0 100%	Entire country	8.6 29%	16.1** 54%	IPC	Jan–May 2022	31.9 100%	Entire country	8.6 27%	17.4** 55%	FEWS NET	Jun 2023	32.6 100%	Entire country	N/A	17–18.0** 55%	
Zambia	Jan–Mar	IPC	Feb–Mar 2021	18.0 38%	64 districts (rural)	2.5 36%	1.7* 25%	IPC	Oct 2022–Mar 2023	18.9 71%	91 districts	6.6 49%	2.0 14%	IPC	Oct 2022–Mar 2023	18.9 71%	91 districts	6.6 49%	2.0 14%	
Zimbabwe	Jan–Mar	IPC	Jan–Mar 2021	15.6 62%	Rural population	3.1 32%	3.4* 35%	FEWS NET	Oct–Dec 2022	15.3 100%	Entire country	N/A	3.0 20%	FEWS NET	Jan–Mar 2023	15.4 100%	Entire country	N/A	3.0–3.5 19–23%	

* The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). ** The estimates for this country include populations classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5).

Country selection and coverage

The GRFC follows a specific process to identify countries and populations within a country for inclusion in the report, to identify which faced food crises and which are major food crises.

The **consideration** of countries/territories for potential inclusion in the GRFC 2023 identified those that experienced a shock in 2022 and for which there was evidence that the magnitude and/or severity of the food crisis exceeded local resources and capacities to respond. Reference is made to countries that requested assistance, as monitored by FAO-GIEWS, or hosted refugee populations. As in past years, the GRFC 2023 did not list high-income countries, even if they had populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, nor did it include countries that did not request humanitarian assistance for populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

A rigorous selection process has been employed over the seven years of the GRFC's existence. The selection process for the GRFC 2023 considered 73 qualifying countries/territories for potential inclusion. Following a review of the evidence, the GRFC Technical Working Group validated acute food insecurity estimates for 58 countries/territories, of which 42 were identified as major food crises. In all seven years, 38 countries consistently qualified as food crises, of which 19 were identified as major food crises. See *Technical Notes*.

The **selection** of countries/territories for inclusion in the GRFC 2023 was based on the availability of data and their methodology meeting the GRFC partners' specific requirements for acute food insecurity estimates, further described in the *Technical Notes*. **Major food crises** were then identified based on the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity. See *table, right*.

1 PRE-SELECTION OF QUALIFYING COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES

48 countries/territories that requested external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by FAO-GIEWS:

- in 2022 or
- at least once in the past 3 years or
- for at least 3 years in the past 10 years

25 low- or middle-income countries/territories were not selected for analysis by FAO-GIEWS, but requested external assistance as a result of:

- hosting refugee populations who were assisted by UNHCR and WFP
- having over 1 million or at least 20 percent of its population forcibly displaced
- having populations affected by conflict and insecurity, weather extremes and/or economic shocks

Countries were excluded if they were high-income countries, if they did not ask for FAO or WFP assistance, or if the shocks had little impact on food security.

73 countries/territories identified

2 SELECTION AND GROUPING OF COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES

15 of the 73 countries/territories identified had data gaps or did not meet GRFC partners' requirements to produce estimates of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent.

The remaining **58** food-crisis countries/territories are grouped into 7 regions:

- Central and Southern Africa
- East Africa
- West Africa and the Sahel, and Cameroon
- Asia
- Europe (Ukraine)
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Middle East and North Africa

58 countries/territories identified

3 IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR FOOD CRISES

42 of the selected countries/territories were identified as major food crises in 2022 based on meeting one or more of the following criteria:


- at least 20 percent of the country population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent
- at least 1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent
- any area in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above
- included in the IASC humanitarian system-wide emergency response level 3

42 countries/territories identified

Geographical coverage

MAP 1.1

Countries/territories that were considered for inclusion in the GRFC 2023



■ Countries that requested external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by FAO-GIEWS in 2022, at least once in the past three years or for at least three years in the past ten years

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon (residents and Syrian refugees), Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

■ Countries/territories that did not meet GIEWS criteria but experienced a shock or shocks to food security in 2022, for which they requested external assistance from FAO and/or WFP

Angola, Colombia (residents, refugees and migrants), Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador (residents, refugees and migrants), El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nepal, Nicaragua, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Peru (residents, refugees and migrants), Philippines, Tajikistan, Togo, Tonga.

■ Countries that did not meet GIEWS criteria but had populations in need of humanitarian assistance as a result of hosting refugee populations who were assisted under the WFP/UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding

Algeria (Sahrawi refugees), Egypt (Syrian refugees), Iran (Afghan refugees), Jordan (Syrian refugees), Rwanda (refugees), Türkiye (Syrian refugees).



TECHNICAL NOTES

GRFC AS A PUBLIC GOOD – CONSULTATION, PARTNERSHIP AND CONSENSUS

1 | PRELIMINARY WORK

Data gathering

FSIN and Food Security Technical Working Groups

- Identify and share relevant data and analyses pertaining to the year 2023 for those countries qualifying for the GRFC 2023 according to the criteria for inclusion and guidelines set and agreed in the technical consultations in December 2022
- Engage with regional and country-level food security and nutrition specialists to try and fill data gaps

2 | RESEARCH, ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION

Data endorsement

FSIN and Technical Working Groups

- Agree to the same criteria for endorsement of data/analysis used in the GRFC 2023
- Identify and endorse peak acute food insecurity estimates for 2023 and assess and validate the reliability of the data source
- Identify and endorse nutrition data
- Identify and endorse displacement data
- Identify and endorse key drivers of acute food insecurity

Drafting

FSIN and Technical Working Groups

- Initial drafting based on data endorsed by the Technical Working Groups
- Complement data and figures with qualitative literature reviews
- Produce relevant infographic, maps, graphics, and other visuals

Quality control

FSIN and Technical Working Groups

- Review and comment on drafts
- Discuss until consensus is reached on draft report

3 | REVIEW AND CLEARANCE

Review

Senior Committee

- Review and comment on the report
- Provide guidance on addressing gaps or lack of consensus
- Troubleshoot on technical challenges
- Discuss until consensus is reached

Finalise production

FSIN

- Implement Senior Committee recommendations
- Refine draft

FSIN

- Final proof-read

Institutional clearance

Senior Committee

- Each partner organisation authority validates the report

4 | RELEASE AND DISSEMINATION

Publication of the 2023 Global Report on Food Crises Mid-Year Update

FSIN and GNAFC

- Digital and physical publication of the full report and related products, including In Briefs (translated into Spanish and French), spotlights, and stand-alone assets (regional overviews, technical notes, data)
- Coordinated communications campaign (including web, social media, and media), to maximize the visibility and outreach
- Tracking of numbers of downloads and visits and usage of the report

All partners are in agreement with the approximate degree of magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity indicated for the countries included in this report except where a disclaimer is present. The differences stem from the varying interpretations of the data related to the factors which contribute to or indicate acute food insecurity.

DATA SELECTION

Country selection process

Step 1 The Senior Committee endorsed the list of countries/territories with the selection rationale that the FSIN and the Food Security Technical Working Group (TWG) used for the GRFC 2023.

Steps for selection included:

1. Pre-select all countries/territories that requested external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by FAO-GIEWS:
 - a. in 2022, or
 - b. at least once in the past 3 years, or
 - c. at least 3 years in the past 10 years

External assistance for logistical support, for capacity building, for longer-term poverty reduction or development purposes is not considered as a qualifying factor for a food crisis.

Countries that did not request external humanitarian food assistance, but which had acute food insecurity analyses available that indicate high levels of food insecurity, are not included in the GRFC. However, the TWG can still consider such analyses for the regional overviews in consultation with the Senior Committee.

2. Exclude high-income countries from the global country list, as these countries are expected to manage their food crises with internal resources.
3. Assess the following among the low or middle-income countries/territories, that are not identified by FAO-GIEWS assessments, but requested external food assistance because of:
 - a. hosting refugee populations who were assisted by UNHCR and WFP. If this criterion is met, only the refugee populations in that country are included, while the host country is only pre-selected if its resident population needed external food assistance.

- b. having over 1 million or at least 20 percent of its population forcibly displaced.
- c. having populations affected by conflict and insecurity, weather extremes and/or economic shocks.

As a result of the above process, **73 countries/territories** were considered for inclusion in the GRFC 2023.

Step 2 FSIN facilitates discussions with the Food Security TWG on the available acute food insecurity data for the countries/territories selected for the GRFC 2023.

The core rules on the data endorsement for the Mid-Year Update were the same as per GRFC 2023, including:

1. Assessment/analysis methodology is among those endorsed by the TWG (see data endorsement)
2. The 2023 peak analysis covers at least one month of 2023, and if several analyses are available, the one describing the highest magnitude of acute food insecurity is selected.

Out of the 73 countries/territories considered for inclusion, **58 had data available** that met the requirements to be included as food crises in the GRFC 2023.

Of these 73, there are **48 countries with data available for the Mid-Year Update, of which 26 are new analyses**, 14 are existing projections and eight are analyses straddling 2022 and 2023.

Out of the 73 countries/territories considered for inclusion, 16 do not have data for both the GRFC 2023 and the Mid-Year Update, 10 only have data for the GRFC 2023 and there were none with data only for the Mid-Year Update.

Data endorsement: sources and methodologies

The data presented in the GRFC and its suite of products follow the data source priority ranking listed below. Exceptions can be made based on the Food Security TWG discussion and agreement on the data that appear to best reflect a particular country's food security situation. This is primarily due to different analysis coverage, timings or when a country/territory has information from several sources.

1. IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity Analysis
2. FEWS NET IPC-compatible analysis
3. WFP's CARI methodology
4. Humanitarian Needs Overview, or similar country team source

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

The IPC results from a partnership of various organizations at the global, regional and country levels and is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of acute food insecurity. There are around 30 countries currently implementing the IPC.

It provides the 'big picture' evidence base of food crises by assessing the following: how severe, how many, when, where, why, who, as well as the key characteristics. It provides data for two time periods – the current situation and future projection. This information helps governments, humanitarian actors and other decision-makers quickly understand a crisis (or potential crisis) and informs appropriate action.

The IPC makes the best use of the evidence available through a transparent, traceable and rigorous process. Evidence requirements to complete classification have been developed, considering the range of circumstances in which evidence quality and quantity may be limited

while ensuring adherence to minimum standards. To ensure the application of the IPC in settings where access for collecting evidence is limited, specialized parameters have been developed. The IPC provides a structured process for making the best assessment of the situation based on what is known and shows the limitations of its classifications as part of the process.

IPC analysis teams consolidate and analyse complex evidence from different methods and sources (e.g., food prices, seasonal calendars, rainfall, food-security assessments, etc.), but the IPC allows them to describe their conclusions using the same, consistent language and standards and in a simple and accessible form. This harmonized approach is particularly useful in comparing situations across countries and regions, and over time.

The IPC technical manual version 3.1 provides information to understand and critically utilize IPC products and the protocols, including tools and procedures, to conduct the classification itself.

See <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/resources/ipc-manual/en/>

Classifying Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5)

Famine is classified at area level in the IPC according to an internationally accepted standard based on the following three criteria:

- At least one in five households face an extreme lack of food
- At least 30 percent of children suffer from wasting
- Two people for every 10 000 dying each day due to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease.

Given the severity and implications of this classification, all regular IPC protocols and special Famine protocols must be met before an area is classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). See *IPC version 3.1*.

Areas can be classified in Famine Likely if minimally adequate evidence available indicates that a Famine

IPC 3.1 acute food insecurity reference table

Phase name and description		Phase 1 None/Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe/Famine	
		Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Households either have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	Households either have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine Classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)	
Priority response objectives		Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction	Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods	Urgent action required to →			
				Protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps	Save lives and livelihoods	Revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods	
First-level outcomes refer to characteristics of food consumption and livelihood change. Thresholds that correspond as closely as possible to the Phase descriptions are included for each indicator. Although cut-offs are based on applied research and presented as global reference, correlation between indicators is often somewhat limited and findings need to be contextualized. The area is classified in the most severe Phase that affects at least 20% of the population.							
Food security first-level outcomes	Food consumption (focus on energy intake)	Quantity: Adequate energy intake Dietary energy intake: Adequate (avg. 2 350 kcal pp/day) and stable Household Dietary Diversity Score: 5–12 food groups and stable Food Consumption Score: Acceptable and stable Household Hunger Scale: 0 (none) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: 0–3 Household Economy Analysis: No livelihood protection deficit Food Insecurity Experience Scale: (FIES 30 days recall): <-0.58	Quantity: Minimally Adequate Dietary energy intake: Minimally adequate (avg. 2 100 kcal pp/day) Household Dietary Diversity Score: 5-FG but deterioration ≥1 FG from typical Food Consumption Score: Acceptable but deterioration from typical Household Hunger Scale: 1 (slight) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: 4–18 Household Economy Analysis: Small or moderate livelihood protection deficit <80% FIES: Between -0.58 and 0.36	Quantity: Moderately Inadequate – Moderate deficits Dietary energy intake: Food gap (below avg. 2 100 kcal pp/day) Household Dietary Diversity Score: 3–4 FG Food Consumption Score: Borderline Household Hunger Scale: 2–3 (moderate) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: ≥19 (non-defining characteristics (NDC) to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) Household Economy Analysis: Livelihood protection deficit ≥80%; or survival deficit <20% FIES: > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	Quantity: Very Inadequate – Large deficits Dietary energy intake: Large food gap; well below 2 100 kcal pp/day Household Dietary Diversity Score: 0–2 FG (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Food Consumption Score: Poor (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Household Hunger Scale: 4 (severe) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: ≥19 (NDC to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) Household Economy Analysis: Survival deficit ≥20% but <50% FIES: > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	Quantity: Extremely Inadequate – Very large deficits Dietary energy intake: Extreme food gap Household Dietary Diversity Score: Poor (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Food Consumption Score: Poor (NDC to differentiate P4 and 5) Household Hunger Scale: 5–6 (severe) Reduced Coping Strategies Index: ≥19 (NDC to differentiate P3, 4 and 5) Household Economy Analysis: Survival deficit ≥50% FIES: > 0.36 (NDC to differentiate between Phases 3, 4 and 5)	
	Livelihood change (assets and strategies)	Livelihood change: Sustainable livelihood strategies and assets Livelihood coping strategies: No stress, crisis or emergency coping observed	Livelihood change: Stressed strategies and/or assets; reduced ability to invest in livelihoods Livelihood coping strategies: Stress strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	Livelihood change: Accelerated depletion/erosion of strategies and/or assets Livelihood coping strategies: Crisis strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	Livelihood change: Extreme depletion/liquidation of strategies and assets Livelihood coping strategies: Emergency strategies are the most severe strategies used by the household in the past 30 days	Livelihood change: Near complete collapse of strategies and assets Livelihood coping strategies: Near exhaustion of coping capacity	
Second-level outcomes refer to area-level estimations of nutritional status and mortality that are especially useful for identification of more severe phases when food gaps are expected to impact malnutrition and mortality. For both nutrition and mortality area outcomes, household food consumption deficits should be an explanatory factor in order for that evidence to be used in support of the classification.							
Food security second-level outcomes	Nutritional status*	Global Acute Malnutrition based on Weight-for-Height Z-score	Acceptable <5%	Alert 5–9.9%	Serious 10–14.9% or > than usual	Critical 15–29.9% or > much greater than average	Extremely Critical ≥30%
		Global Acute Malnutrition based on Mid-Upper Arm Circumference	<5%	5–9.9%	10–14.9%	≥15%	
		Body Mass Index <18.5	<5%	5–9.9%	10–19.9%, 1.5 x greater than baseline	20–39.9%	≥40%
Mortality*		Crude Death Rate <0.5/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate <1/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate <0.5/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate <1/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate 0.5–0.99/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate 1–2/10 000/day	Crude Death Rate 1–1.99/10,000/day or <2x reference Under-five Death Rate 2–3.99/10,000/day	Crude Death Rate ≥2/10,000/day Under-five Death Rate ≥4/10,000/day	
For contributing factors, specific indicators and thresholds for different phases need to be determined and analysed according to the livelihood context; nevertheless, general descriptions for contributing factors are provided below.							
Food security contributing factors	Food availability, access, utilization, and stability	Adequate to meet short-term food consumption requirements Safe water ≥15 litres pp/day	Borderline adequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water marginally ≥15 litres pp/day	Inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water >7.5 to 15 litres pp/day	Very inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water >3 to <7.5 litres pp/day	Extremely inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe water ≤3 litres pp/day	
	Hazards and vulnerability	None or minimal effects of hazards and vulnerability on livelihoods and food consumption	Effects of hazards and vulnerability stress livelihoods and food consumption	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in loss of assets and/or significant food consumption deficits	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in large loss of livelihood assets and/or extreme food consumption deficits	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in near complete collapse of livelihood assets and/or near complete food consumption deficits	

DATA SELECTION

may be occurring or will occur. This classification should trigger prompt action by decision-makers to address the situation while calling for urgent efforts to collect more evidence. Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe, the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

The IPC supports Famine prevention by highlighting the following:

- IPC Phase 4 Emergency is an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods.
- Households can be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if areas are not classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). This is the case when less than 20 percent of the population is experiencing Famine conditions and/or when malnutrition and/or mortality levels have not (or not yet) reached Famine thresholds. These households experience the same severity of conditions even if the area is not yet classified in Famine. This can occur due to the time lag between food insecurity, malnutrition and mortality, or in the case of a localized situation.
- Projections of Famine can be made even if the areas are not currently classified in Famine, thus allowing early warning.

Risk of Famine is an IPC statement that highlights the potential deterioration of the situation compared with the most-likely scenario expected during the projection period. Although it is not an IPC classification, it indicates a worst-case scenario that has a reasonable probability of occurring.

Cadre Harmonisé (CH)

The Cadre Harmonisé is the multi-dimensional analytical framework used by CILSS for the analysis and identification of areas and groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon. It aims to inform national and regional food crisis prevention and management systems. It considers

various indicators of food and nutrition security outcomes and contributing factors.

The CH relies on existing food security and nutrition information systems that have been in place in most Sahelian countries since 1985, and more recently in other coastal countries of West Africa. There are 18 countries currently implementing the CH: Burkina Faso, Benin, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

The CH version 2.0 clarifies the specific functions and protocols for carrying out an integrated and consensual analysis of acute food and nutrition insecurity.

See <http://www.cilss.int/index.php/2019/10/04/cadre-harmonise-manuel-version-2-0/>

IPC/CH five-phase classification

As a result of technical developments of the CH tools and processes and harmonization efforts over the last decade, IPC and CH acute food insecurity approaches are very close to each other and give comparable figures of acute food insecurity. The five-phase classification is the same though there are a few differences pertaining to the use of certain indicators, classification of famine and estimation of humanitarian assistance.

Classification into five phases: 1. None/Minimal, 2. Stressed, 3. Crisis, 4. Emergency and 5. Catastrophe/Famine is based on a convergence of available evidence, including indicators related to food consumption, livelihoods, malnutrition and mortality. Each phase has important and distinct implications for where and how best to intervene and thus influences priority response objectives. Populations in IPC/CH Phases 3-5 (Crisis, Emergency and Catastrophe) are deemed to be those in need of urgent food, livelihood and nutrition assistance. Populations in IPC/CH Phase 2 (Stressed) require a distinct set of actions – ideally disaster risk reduction and livelihood protection interventions. Classifying IPC/CH Phase 5 (Famine) requires analytical conclusions that meet three specific criteria.

FEWS NET

Funded and managed by USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) provides early warning and evidence-based analysis of acute food insecurity to inform humanitarian and development response. FEWS NET is monitoring 29 countries where it analyses the dynamics of food, nutrition and livelihood security so policymakers can design programmes that address the root causes of persistent or recurrent acute food insecurity, undernutrition and vulnerability.

FEWS NET classification is IPC-compatible, which means it follows key IPC protocols but is not built on multi-partner technical consensus, so it does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.

See <https://fews.net/fews-data/333>

CARI

WFP has developed, and uses, the Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodology. This methodology is also commonly used by other food security partners in their assessments. CARI is a widespread practice for Multi-Sector Needs Assessments, used in calculating the People in Need figure for countries/territories not covered by IPC/CH analyses.

Before any intervention, WFP analyses the food security situation with partners to perform effective targeting, determines the most appropriate type and scale of intervention and ensures the most efficient use of humanitarian resources.

The CARI addresses the multiple dimensions of food security through five indicators – Food Consumption Score, reduced Coping Strategies Index, Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (ECMEN) OR Food Expenditure Share, and Livelihood Coping Strategies.

Example of a completed CARI console

DOMAIN		INDICATOR	FOOD SECURE (1)	MARGINALLY FOOD SECURE (2)	MODERATELY FOOD INSECURE (3)	SEVERELY FOOD INSECURE (4)
CURRENT STATUS	Food Consumption	Food consumption groups FCG and reduced Coping Strategies Index	Acceptable consumption and reduced Coping Index below 4 21.1%	Acceptable consumption and reduced Coping Index 4 or above 30.3%	Borderline consumption 36.2%	Poor consumption 13.4%
COPING CAPACITY	Economic Capacity	ECMEN (or Food expenditure share when ECMEN is not available)	Total expenditure > MEB Food Expenditure Share <50%	Food Expenditure Share 50-65%	SMEB > Total Exp < MEB Food Expenditure Share 65-75% 18.4%	Total Exp < SMEB Food Expenditure Share >75% 71.5%
	Livelihood Coping Strategies	Livelihood Coping Strategies – Food Security	No coping 10.1%	Stress 19%	Crisis 3.6%	Emergency 11.4%
Food Security Index (CARI)			30.1%	27.0%	25.3%	17.6%

DATA SELECTION

Each surveyed household is classified into one of four food security categories – food secure, marginally food secure, moderately food insecure and severely food insecure. The results are presented within the CARI food security console, which provides the prevalence of each available CARI food security indicator. The aggregate results provide the population’s overall food security outcome or Food Security Index (FSI).

Populations that are classified as ‘moderately acute food insecure’ and ‘severely acute food insecure’ as per WFP’s CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above.

Indicators used by the CARI may be used within IPC/CH analyses, but there are differences between the two methods. The fundamental one is that the CARI analyses primary data from a single-household survey, while the IPC/CH uses a ‘convergence-of-evidence’ approach, incorporating and analysing a variety of secondary information. The CARI assesses the situation at a fixed point in time with no projection, the IPC/CH provides the current snapshot and a projection based on the most likely scenario for a period in the future.

Change in CARI methodology

The third edition was launched in December 2021, and it introduced two changes: firstly, the food consumption domain now includes Reduced Coping Strategies Index in addition to Food Consumption Group; and secondly, Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (ECMEN) is now the preferred measure for economic vulnerability instead of food expenditure share, which is better for assistance targeting purposes. The main implication for the GRFC is comparison with prior surveys.

The ECMEN indicator identifies the percentage of households whose expenditures exceed the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB). A MEB is defined as what a household requires in order to meet their essential needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, and its cost. The MEB covers those needs that households meet fully or partially through the market. It serves as a monetary

threshold that can be used to assess a household’s economic capacity to meet their needs. To compute the ECMEN, household expenditures are used as a proxy for household economic capacity.

Link to CARI methodology <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000134704/download/>

Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and other estimates

OCHA HNOs provide the People in Need (PiN) figure for the Food Security and Livelihoods cluster, based on data collected during the year and it is endorsed by the Humanitarian Country Team in each country/territory. Similarly, food insecurity estimates are provided by OCHA in the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and Joint Response Plan (JRP). When no other sources for acute food insecurity estimates are available, the GRFC food security TWG assesses the methodology of the PiN to ensure it is based on acute food insecurity indicators and equivalent to IPC/CH Phase 3 or above.

Data lacking partnership consensus, and data gaps

All information in the GRFC is carefully assessed prior to use in the report, particularly on the methods and indicators used in the analysis. Because of this rigorous process, there are countries where food security information is available, but the source does not use the methods endorsed by the GRFC food security TWG. The information is acknowledged and the decision not to utilize it in the report is primarily because it lacks consensus among all partners. Until a neutral comparability study on indicators is available, such countries are listed as ‘data not meeting GRFC requirements’. This refers to publicly available information in which partners identified limitations and therefore did not deem it appropriate for use in the

report, whereas a “data gap” refers to absence of any public analysis for the year in question.

Citing the data source

All data sources are referenced according to the month and year of its publication.

Acute food insecurity peak for 2023

The peak estimate is based on the highest number of acutely food-insecure people in the year in question as reported by endorsed data sources. It does not reflect the latest analysis available but purely the observed peak.’ The peak can be either an analysis made for the current period in 2023 or a projections made in 2022 or 2023 and referring to a period of the year 2023.

Number of countries with data sources for the 2022 peak estimates and 2023 projection estimates

Data sources	2022	2023
IPC	27	23
CH	15	15
FEWS NET	3	7
WFP CARI	6	2
HNO	7	-

A projection update or a new analysis that covers at least part of the previous projection period overrides the original projection findings since the latest analysis is based on more up-to-date information, hence providing more accurate findings.

¹ AFI estimates are rounded in this document.

Data from non-IPC/CH (FEWS NET, CARI and HNO analyses) sources are presented in the country narratives according to the terminology and categorization used in the original data source.

The wording ‘high levels of acute food insecurity’ or ‘IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, or equivalent’ are used to include both IPC/CH estimates and any food security estimates that are based on non-IPC/CH data sources reflecting an approximation of IPC Phase 3 and above.

Information is presented in summary tables as IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent without further breakdown to more specific IPC/CH Phases.

Graphs

To better contextualize acute food insecurity levels, the graphs show numbers of acutely food-insecure people, disaggregated by phase where possible, along with numbers of people in IPC/CH Phases 1 and 2 and the total country population.

Maps

Boundaries and names shown and designations used on the maps in this document do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. A dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

The drivers of food crises are often interlinked and mutually reinforcing, making it difficult to pinpoint the specific trigger or driver of each food crisis.

Also, it is acknowledged that food insecurity is not driven solely by the occurrence of a hazard, but rather by the interaction between hazards and people specific vulnerabilities. Although not listing each specific vulnerability factor for each country, the GRFC 2023 takes a practical approach by estimating which are the most salient drivers for each country/territory out of the broad categories explained below. The Food Security TWG analyses each selected country and identifies which of the drivers could be considered as the primary driver. For countries with two or more drivers affecting various parts of the country, the primary driver was selected based on analysis of how many people were affected by each of the drivers. The GRFC presents the number of countries by primary driver in global and regional narratives and aggregates the corresponding numbers of acutely food insecure people.

For countries where the analysis is purely focused on the displaced populations, the primary driver reflects the reason those populations are displaced from their country of origin.

Conflict/insecurity

This includes interstate and intra-state conflicts, internal violence, banditry and criminality, civil unrest or political crises often leading to population displacements and/or disruption of livelihoods and food systems.

It is a key driver of acute food insecurity because in conflict situations civilians are frequently deprived of their income sources and or have difficulties in accessing food as food systems and markets are disrupted, pushing up food prices and sometimes leading to scarcities of water and fuel, or of food itself.

Landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices often destroy agricultural land, mills, storage facilities, machinery etc.

Conflict prevents businesses from operating and weakens the national economy, reducing employment opportunities, increasing poverty levels and diverting government spending towards the war effort.

Health systems are usually damaged or destroyed, leaving people reliant on humanitarian support – yet increasingly, insecurity and roadblocks prevent humanitarian convoys from reaching the most vulnerable, or aid agencies face lengthy delays, restrictions on personnel or the type or quantity of aid supplies, or insufficient security guarantees. Parties to conflict can deny people access to food as a weapon of war, especially in areas under blockade/embargo. Food insecurity itself can become a trigger for violence and instability, particularly in contexts marked by pervasive inequalities and fragile institutions. Sudden spikes in food prices tend to exacerbate the risk of political unrest and conflict (FAO et al., 2017).

For countries with conflict/insecurity as the primary driver during the past year, change to another primary driver needs serious consideration as recovery from conflict/insecurity takes a long time and may remain as the underlying cause of food insecurity. In cases where conflict/insecurity has reduced and/or localized, with other drivers showing a predominant effect, the change in the primary driver from the previous year is considered.

Weather extremes

These include droughts, floods, dry spells, storms, cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons and the untimely start of rainy seasons.

Weather extremes drive food insecurity by directly affecting crops and/or livestock, cutting off roads and preventing markets from being stocked. Poor harvests push up food prices and diminish agricultural employment opportunities and pastoralists' terms-of-trade, lowering purchasing power and access to food, and triggering an early lean season when households are more market-reliant because of reduced food stocks.

Adverse weather events are particularly grave for smallholder farmers and pastoralists who rely on agriculture and livestock-rearing to access food and often lack the resilience capacities to withstand and recover from the impacts of such shocks. People's vulnerability to weather shock events rests on their capacity to adapt and bounce back after their livelihood has been affected, as well as the scale and frequency of shocks. Repeated events further erode capacity to withstand future shocks.

Weather events and changes in climate can lead to an intensification of conflict, for instance, between pastoralist herders and farmers over access to water and grazing. There is ample evidence suggesting that natural disasters – particularly droughts – contribute to aggravating existing civil conflicts.

Economic shocks

Economic shocks at country level can affect the food insecurity of households or individuals through various channels. Macroeconomic shocks may lead to increases in acute food insecurity through for instance, a contraction in GDP leading to high unemployment rates and consequent loss of income for those affected households, or a significant contraction in exports and/or a critical decrease in investments and other capital inflows, bringing a significant currency depreciation and high inflation, increasing production costs and food prices and worsening terms of trade which may lead to increases in acute food insecurity. High debt and limited fiscal space constrain economic growth, increase vulnerability to economic shocks and detract from development spending.

Increases in world market prices of staple grains, oil and agricultural inputs can affect food availability, push up domestic food prices for consumers and reduce their purchasing power. Economic shocks can also occur at a more localized level or hit only a particular socioeconomic category of households. For instance, pastoralists' facing lack of animal feed, veterinary

services, subsequent deteriorating livestock body conditions and depressed livestock prices are likely to be affected by a reduction in purchasing power and face a constrained access to food as a result.

Disease outbreaks

Disease outbreaks (occurrence of disease cases in excess of normal expectancy) are usually caused by an infection, transmitted through person-to-person contact, animal-to-person contact, or from the environment or other media. Water, sanitation, food and air quality are vital elements in the transmission of communicable diseases and in the spread of diseases prone to cause epidemics.

Displaced populations – particularly in overcrowded camps – are more susceptible to disease outbreaks which strained health systems cannot prevent or control (WHO). Epidemics and pandemics can also affect the ability of people to carry on their activities and livelihoods and, in the worst cases when widespread, may also affect markets and supply chains.

Crop pests and animal diseases

Transboundary plant pests and diseases can easily spread to several countries and reach epidemic proportions. Outbreaks and upsurges can cause huge losses to crops and pastures, threatening the livelihoods of vulnerable farmers and the food and nutrition security of millions at a time.

All animal diseases have the potential to adversely affect human populations by reducing the quantity and quality of food, other livestock products (hides, skins, fibres) and animal power (traction, transport) that can be obtained from a given quantity of resources and by reducing people's assets. Transboundary Animal Diseases (TADs) may be defined as those epidemic diseases that are highly contagious or transmissible and have the potential for very rapid spread, irrespective of national borders, causing serious socioeconomic and possibly public health consequences.

NUTRITION AND HEALTH

Key indicators and categorization

Wasting

Moderate wasting using the weight for height indicator is identified by weight for height z scores (WHZ) between -2 and -3 of the reference population, and severe wasting by WHZ below -3. Wasting reflects both moderate and severe wasting in a population. Wasting can also be defined by Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) measurements ≤ 12.5 cm, with severe wasting defined with a measurement of ≤ 11.5 cm.

Severity index for prevalence of wasting in children aged 6–59 months

Prevalence ranges	Label
< 2.5%	Very low
2.5–< 5%	Low
5–< 10%	Medium
10–< 15%	High
$\geq 15\%$	Very high

Source: De Onis et al. Public Health Nutrition, 2018. Available at: <https://www.who.int/nutrition/team/prevalence-thresholds-wasting-overweight-stunting-children-paper.pdf>

Minimum Dietary Diversity

This indicator refers to the percentage of children aged 6–23 months who receive foods from five or more out of eight food groups a day.

The eight food groups are: i. breastmilk; ii. grains, roots and tubers; iii. legumes and nuts; iv. dairy products (infant formula, milk, yogurt, cheese); v. flesh foods (meat, fish, poultry and liver/organ meats); vi. eggs; vii. vitamin-A rich fruits and vegetables; viii. other fruits and vegetables. In some surveys, minimum dietary diversity is calculated based on seven food groups, excluding breastmilk. In these cases, the indicator refers to the percentage of children aged 6–23 months who receive foods from four or more out of seven food groups a day.

Minimum Meal Frequency

The indicator refers to the proportion of children aged 6–23 months who receive solid, semi-solid or soft foods at least the minimum number of recommended times a day depending on their age and whether they are breastfed.

Minimum Acceptable Diet

This composite indicator combines meal frequency and dietary diversity to assess the proportion of children aged 6–23 months consuming a diet that meets the minimum requirements for growth and development.

Prevalence ranges	Label
> 70%	Phase 1 – Acceptable/minimal
40–70%	Phase 2 – Alert/stress
20–39.9%	Phase 3 – Serious/severe
10–19.9%	Phase 4 – Critical/extreme
< 10%	Phase 5 – Extremely critical/catastrophic

Source: Preliminary thresholds suggested by IFE Core Group.

Percentage of households not consuming micronutrient-rich food (analysed in refugee populations)

This refers to the proportion of households with no member consuming any vegetables, fruits, meat, eggs, fish/seafood, and milk/milk products over a reference period of 24 hours. The food group of vegetables, fruits, meat, eggs, fish/seafood, and milk/milk products are the same as the 12 food groups defined by FAO (2011).

Access to basic drinking water services

Improved drinking water sources are those which, by nature of their design and construction, have the potential to deliver safe water. The WHO and UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply Sanitation and Hygiene (JMP) subdivides the population using improved sources into three groups (safely managed, basic and limited) according to the level of service provided. In order to meet the criteria for a safely managed drinking water service, people must use an improved source meeting three criteria: accessible on premises; available when needed; free from contamination. If the improved source does not meet any one of these criteria but a round trip to collect water takes 30 minutes or less, then it is classified as a basic drinking water service. If water collection from an improved source exceeds 30 minutes, it is categorized as a limited service (WHO and UNICEF).

LIMITATIONS AND COMPARABILITY

Limitations and data challenges, 2023

There is no breakdown by phase due to the use of non-IPC/CH data sources in nine countries: Angola, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan (refugees), Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe. The only potential distinction would be between moderately and severely acutely food-insecure populations in Jordan and Sri Lanka.

Lack of/low data availability for refugee food security

Refugee food security is measured in various ways across refugee populations and data are not systematically collected, disaggregated, consolidated or shared.

WFP ENA assessment is available for refugee populations in Rwanda and IFRC vulnerability assessment for Syrian refugees in Türkiye but not accepted by the GRFC 2023 for inclusion.

Comparability of acute food insecurity estimates in food crises, 2022–2023

This section briefly summarizes the countries for which comparing figures for 2022 and 2023 needs a careful understanding of the differences in methodology, the representativeness and coverage.

Angola

The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Angola are not comparable due to a change in data source and coverage. In 2022, the peak was derived from an IPC analysis, covering only 58 percent of the country. In contrast, the 2023 estimate is based on a FEWS NET analysis with full coverage, making the two periods not directly comparable.

Bangladesh

The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Bangladesh are not comparable due to changes in methodology. In 2022, the peak was derived from the Joint Response Plan on the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, analyzing Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs) and host communities in Cox’s Bazar. However, in 2023, the estimate is based on a new IPC analysis covering 15 districts across Bangladesh, including FDMNs in camps. This substantial increase in the analysed population from 1.4 million to 38.2 million, along with the change in methodology, makes the two periods incomparable.

El Salvador

The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in El Salvador are not comparable due to the change in data source. The 2022 peak was derived from IPC analysis, while the 2023 estimate is based on a FEWS NET analysis.

Ethiopia

The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Ethiopia are not comparable due to the change in data source. The 2022 peak was derived from HRP, whereas the 2023 estimate is based on a FEWS NET analysis.

Ghana

The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Ghana are not directly comparable, even though both are based on the CH methodology, since the population analysed increased from 44 percent to 100 percent.

Jordan (refugee population)

The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Jordan's refugee population are not comparable, although both are based on WFP's CARI methodology. The analysed population increased by 11 percent between the two years.

Kenya

The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Kenya are not comparable, despite both being based on the IPC methodology. The analysed population increased by 12 percent.

Mauritania

The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Mauritania are not comparable, even though both are based on the CH methodology. The population analysed declined by 19 percent.

Nigeria

The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Nigeria are not comparable due an significant expansion to changes in the coverage of the CH analysis. The population analysed increased by 22 percent, covering 26 states and the FCT in 2023 up from 21 states and the FCT in 2022 from 159.1 million people to 193.6 million.

Pakistan

The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Pakistan are not comparable, even though both are based on the IPC methodology, due to the increase in geographical coverage from 28 to 43 districts, representing an increase from 19.8 million to 36.7 million people analysed.

Sierra Leone

The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Sierra Leone are not comparable, even though both are based on the CH methodology. This lack of comparability is mainly due to an official revision of the country's population estimate based on a recent census conducted by the government, which found a 12 percent decline in the population.

Yemen

The peak estimates for 2022 and 2023 in Yemen are not comparable due to changes in the data source. The 2022 peak was derived from IPC analysis, while the 2023 estimate is based on a FEWS NET analysis.

FEWS NET analyses with range estimates

For those countries where ranges are provided (Angola, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Uganda, Yemen, Zimbabwe) the regional aggregate comparison is computed considering the upper bound. When this is the case, no year-on-year comparison is provided at country level.

HISTORICAL INCLUSION

Historical inclusion of countries/territories in the GRFC, 2017–23

Over the seven years of the GRFC’s existence, 38 countries have systematically appeared as food crises each year following the rigorous selection process.

Thirteen countries have regularly been selected for inclusion but subsequently excluded because of recurrent data gaps. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have had estimates available only once and qualified as major food crises. The other countries regularly excluded are: Cuba, the Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Peru (migrants), Philippines, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste and Vanuatu. On the other hand, the Kyrgyz Republic – a regularly excluded country, was no longer identified as a food crisis.

Economic shocks drove new countries – Colombia, Ecuador and Peru – to be identified as food crises in 2022.

Over the seven years, several regional crises have featured, allowing for coverage of countries that would otherwise not have qualified for inclusion as a major food crises. The Lake Chad Basin region, encompassing the Extrême Nord region of Cameroon, western Chad, northeastern Nigeria and eastern Niger, was included in 2017, 2018 and 2019 editions. The Central Sahel region, covering Burkina Faso, Mali and western Tillabéri and Tahoua regions in the Niger, was in the GRFC 2020. The Central American Dry Corridor region (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras) was in the 2018–2020 editions. As many of these food crises have grown in severity and magnitude, the countries have qualified for inclusion in their own right.

See Appendix 2: Country selection criteria and coverage for the GRFC 2023.

Numbers of food crises considered and identified for years 2016–2023

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023*
Number of potential food crises considered	65	61	66	71	79	77	73	73
Number of food crises identified (with endorsed data)	48	51	53	55	55	53	58	48

* GRFC 2023 Mid-Year Update.

Frequency of inclusion of food crises countries/territories with data meeting the GRFC requirements, 2017–2023

Number of years	Number of countries/territories	Countries/territories
7	38	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
6	8	Angola, Djibouti, El Salvador, Guinea Bissau, Namibia, Pakistan, Palestine*, United Republic of Tanzania, Ukraine
5	4	Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Lebanon (refugees), Myanmar
4	1	Jordan (refugees)
3	3	Colombia (migrants), Ecuador (migrants), Türkiye (refugees)
2	6	Egypt (refugees), Nepal, Rwanda (refugees), South Africa, Sri Lanka, Togo
1	7	Algeria (refugees), Congo (national or refugees), Colombia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Peru (migrants), Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

* The occupied Palestinian territories are referred to as Palestine in the GRFC 2023.

GLOSSARY

Acute food insecurity

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food insecurity at a specific point in time that is of a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration.

These acute states are highly susceptible to change and can manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity and malnutrition (IPC, 2019). Transitory food insecurity is a short-term or temporary inability to meet food consumption requirements related to sporadic crises, indicating a capacity to recover.

Asylum-seekers

An asylum-seeker is a person seeking sanctuary in a country other than their own and waiting for a decision about their status. The legal processes related to asylum are complex and variable, which is a challenge when it comes to counting, measuring and understanding the asylum-seeking population. When an asylum application is successful, the person is awarded refugee status.

Chronic food insecurity

Chronic food insecurity refers to food insecurity that persists over time, largely due to structural causes. The definition includes seasonal food insecurity that occurs during periods with non-exceptional conditions.

Chronic food insecurity has relevance in providing strategic guidance to actions that focus on the medium- and long-term improvement of the quality and quantity of food consumption for an active and healthy life (FAO *et al.*, 2021). FAO defines this as 'undernourishment' and it is the basis for the SDG indicator 2.1.1 published in the SOFI report.

Moderate food insecurity refers to the level of severity of food insecurity, based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), in which people face uncertainties about their ability to obtain food and have been forced to reduce, at times during the year, the quality and/or quantity of food they consume due to lack of money or other resources. It thus refers to a lack of consistent access to food, which diminishes dietary quality, disrupts normal eating patterns, and can have negative consequences for nutrition, health and well-being.

Severe food insecurity refers to the level of severity of food insecurity in which people have likely run out of food, experienced hunger and, at the most extreme, gone for days without eating, putting their health and well-being at grave risk, based on the FIES (FAO *et al.*, 2021).

According to the *SOFI Report 2023*, between 690 million and 783 million people in the world faced hunger in 2022 – an increase by about 122 million since before the COVID-19 pandemic. Around 11.3 percent of the global population was severely food insecure in 2022, representing 900 million people. Around 2.4 billion people in the world were moderately or severely food insecure (FAO *et al.*, July 2023).

Coping strategies

Coping strategies are measures to which people resort in order to obtain food, income and/or other essential goods or services when their normal means of livelihood have been disrupted or other shocks/hazards affect their access to basic needs.

Export prohibitions and restrictions

Export prohibitions and restrictions are export measures that have a limiting effect on the quantity or amount of a product being exported. They can take the form of a tax or a quantitative restriction. The latter is generally prohibited with some exceptions, notably those applied to prevent or relieve critical shortage of foodstuffs.

Food access

Food access refers to access by households/individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.

Food availability

Food availability refers to the availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.

Food crisis

A food crisis occurs when rates of acute food insecurity and malnutrition rise sharply at local or national levels, raising the need for emergency food assistance.

Food crises are far more likely among populations already suffering from prolonged food insecurity and malnutrition. A food crisis is usually set off by a shock or combination of shocks that affect one or more of the pillars of food security: food availability, food access, food utilization or food stability.

Food crises can also occur in countries that have important economic activities and are major food exporters, such as Ukraine.

Forced displacement

Forced displacement is an involuntary or coerced movement of a person or people away from their home or home region as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence or human rights violations. Displacement is often a side-effect of conflict, food insecurity and weather shocks.

Displaced people are often more vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition, having had to abandon their livelihoods and assets, undertake arduous journeys, and settle in areas or camps with limited access to basic services or former social networks. Their rights are often restricted due to host country legal frameworks, resulting in a lack of access to land, employment and freedom of movement. They are often dependent on humanitarian assistance to meet their food needs.

Displaced populations often face severely compromised access to safe water and improved sanitation and are at increased risk of frequent outbreaks of infectious disease, which weakened health systems cannot treat, prevent or control. In crises, children are often not able to access other preventive services such as micronutrient supplementation and immunization, further increasing the risk of malnutrition. Displacement can also result in the breakdown of familial and community networks that provide the necessary support and guidance for looking after young children.

Food insecurity

Food insecurity refers to the lack of secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal human growth and development and an active and healthy life. For people to be food secure, food must be both consistently available and accessible in sufficient quantities and diversity, and households must be able to utilize (store, cook, prepare and share) the food in a way that has a positive nutritional impact.

GLOSSARY

GIEWS assessment (used in country selection for GRFC)

The FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) classifies and regularly updates the list of countries requiring external assistance for food, dividing them into three categories according to the predominant driver: countries with (1) an exceptional shortfall in aggregate food production and supplies; (2) widespread lack of access to food; and (3) severe localized food insecurity.

Internally displaced people

IDPs are those people forced to flee their homes as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border.

Livelihoods

People's capabilities, assets (both material and social) and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being, and the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about activities.

Major food crisis

A food crisis is defined as 'major' if more than 1 million people or more than 20 percent of a total area, region or country population is estimated to be facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent, or if at least one area is classified in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or worse, or if the country is included in the IASC humanitarian system-wide emergency response-level 3.

Malnutrition

Malnutrition is an umbrella term that covers undernutrition and overweight, obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes and cancer. See <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malnutrition>.

Undernutrition is a consequence of inadequate nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness or disease. Acute malnutrition (wasting, thinness and/or bilateral pitting oedema), stunting, underweight (a composite of stunting and wasting) and micronutrient deficiencies (e.g. deficiencies in vitamin A, iron) are all forms of undernutrition.

While overweight, obesity and NCDs are not a focus of this report, they often coexist with undernutrition within the same country, community and even individual. Stunted children, for example, face a greater risk of becoming overweight as adults (UNICEF).

Malnutrition has immediate and long-reaching consequences, including stunting children's growth, increasing susceptibility to disease and infections, and contributing to 45 percent of deaths among children aged under 5 (WHO). The determinants of malnutrition also include inadequate access to healthcare, poor water and sanitation services, and inappropriate child-feeding and care practices, as described in the UNICEF framework.

Migrants

According to IOM, migrant is an umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants and those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students.

A migrant with the intention to settle is someone who has reached the final destination country, where the person wishes to remain permanently.

- Transit migrant is someone who is temporarily staying in one or more countries with the objective of reaching a further and final destination country.
- Pendular migrant: Temporary and usually repeated population movements, which may represent a movement pattern within a country and between neighbouring countries.

Minimum Expenditure Basket

A Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) is defined as what a household requires in order to meet basic needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, and its average cost. The MEB is a monetary threshold – the cost of these goods, utilities, services and resources – and is conceptually equivalent to a poverty line. It typically describes the cost of meeting one month's worth of essential needs. Since the MEB sets a monetary threshold for what is needed to cover essential needs, the households whose expenditures fall below the MEB are defined as being unable to meet their essential needs. More information is available: <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000074198/download/>

Nutritional status

Nutritional status refers to the physiological state of an individual that results from the relationship between nutrient intake and requirements and the body's ability to digest, absorb and use these nutrients.

Nutritious foods

Nutritious foods are referred to as safe foods that contribute essential nutrients such as vitamins and minerals (micronutrients), fibre and other components to healthy diets that are beneficial for growth, and health and development, guarding against malnutrition. In nutritious foods, the presence of nutrients of public health concern (including saturated fats, free sugars and salt/sodium) is minimized, industrially produced trans fats are eliminated, and salt is iodized.

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity

People who are referred to as 'facing high levels of acute food insecurity' are in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. However, this does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action to decrease food gaps and protect and save lives and livelihoods. This is because some households may only be classified in IPC/CH Phase 1 or 2 because they receive assistance, and are in fact in need of continued action. In many countries, the number in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) refers to populations in need of action further to that already taken.

People in Need (PiN) vs gap

PiN estimates, used in HNOs, are based on analysis that does not take into consideration humanitarian assistance. This is purely a figure for the number of people who would need assistance. The gap, however, takes into consideration all existing and likely happening assistance, and bases the needs according to unmet needs. In summary, the gap figure is smaller, and should only reflect those who need assistance on top of the assistance already being provided.

GLOSSARY

Prevalence

The proportion of a population who have a specific characteristic in a given time period.

Primary driver of acute food insecurity

Although acknowledging that drivers are often interlinked and mutually reinforcing, the GRFC identifies as primary driver the most prominent trigger of acute food insecurity for each country/territory in terms of number of people affected on a yearly basis.

Refugees

A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence. Refugees are recognized under various international agreements. Some are recognized as a group or on a 'prima facie' basis while others undergo an individual investigation before being given refugee status. The 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees provide the full legal definition of a refugee.

Stateless people

A stateless person is someone who does not have a nationality of any country. Some people are born stateless, but others become stateless due to a variety of reasons, including sovereign, legal, technical or administrative decisions or oversights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights underlines that 'Everyone has the right to a nationality' (UNGA, 1948, article 15).

Stunting

Stunting is associated with physical and cognitive damage which can affect learning and school performance, and lead to lost potential and lower earnings later in life. It can also affect the next generation. Efforts to prevent stunting are most effective in the 1 000 days between conception and a child's second birthday. Stunted children aged under 5 years are identified by a height-for-age z score (HAZ) below -2 of the reference population. Severe stunting is defined as HAZ below -3.

Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket

While the MEB is defined as what a household requires in order to meet their essential needs, on a regular or seasonal basis, and its average cost, the SMEB is the absolute minimum amount required to maintain existence and cover life-saving needs, which could involve the deprivation of certain human rights. However, the concepts of SMEB and MEB have not always been used consistently by the humanitarian community and are sometimes used interchangeably. It is therefore important to be clear from the outset of the analysis whether a MEB or SMEB is the goal. More information is available: <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000074198/download/>

Undernourishment

Undernourishment is defined as the condition in which an individual's habitual food consumption is insufficient to provide the amount of dietary energy required to maintain a normal, active, healthy life. For the purposes of this report, hunger is defined as being synonymous with chronic undernourishment. The PoU is used to measure hunger.

Undernutrition

Undernutrition is a consequence of insufficient nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness or disease. Acute malnutrition (wasting and/or bilateral pitting oedema), stunting, underweight (a composite of stunting and wasting) and micronutrient deficiencies (e.g. deficiencies in vitamin A, iron) are all forms of undernutrition.

Vulnerability

Vulnerability refers to the conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes that increase the susceptibility of an individual, community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards. Vulnerability to food insecurity is the range of conditions that increases the susceptibility of a household to the impact on food security in case of a shock or hazard.

Wasting

A child who is too thin for his or her height as a result of rapid weight loss or the failure to gain weight is a sign of wasting which, although treatable, can lead to illness, disability or death. Moderate wasting is identified by weight-for-height z scores (WHZ) between -2 and -3 of the reference population, and severe wasting by WHZ below -3. Global Acute Malnutrition reflects both moderate and severe wasting in a population as well as presence of bilateral pitting oedema. Wasting can also be defined by Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) measurements ≤ 12.5 cm, with severe wasting defined with a measurement of ≤ 11.5 cm. Wasting is used in this report to describe all forms of acute malnutrition including those diagnosed with oedema. Affected children require urgent feeding, treatment and care to survive. Wasting prevalence depicts the nutrition situation in the general population at a specific time: it can show marked seasonal patterns and can change quickly over time.

The immediate cause of wasting is a severe nutritional restriction as a result of inadequate food intake or recent illness, such as diarrhoea, that hinders appropriate intake and absorption of nutrients.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chapter 1

Spotlight – Economic impact of the war in Ukraine

FAO. 2023. World Food Situation – FAO Food Price Index. July 2023. <https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/>

WFP and FAO. 2023. Hunger Hotspots – FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity, June 2023 to November 2023 outlook. May 2023. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000149627/download/?_ga=2.29949311.1171674477.1689210049-1909677102.1689210049

FAO. 2023. FAO Food Outlook: Global output set for expansion, but declining imports by the most vulnerable countries are a cause for concern. June 2023. <https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/fao-food-outlook-global-output-set-for-expansion-but-declining-imports-by-the-most-vulnerable-countries-are-a-cause-for-concern/en>

FAO. 2023. FAO Food Outlook: Biannual Report Global Food Markets. June 2023. <https://www.fao.org/3/cc3020en/cc3020en.pdf>

FEWS NET. 2023. Key Message Update: Kakhovka dam breach leaves thousands without water, threatens summer crops. June 2023. <https://fews.net/europe-and-eurasia/ukraine/key-message-update/june-2023>

FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises. 2023. Global Report on Food Crises 2023. May 2023. <https://www.fsinplatform.org/global-report-food-crises-2023>

IFPRI. 2023. Increased tensions in Ukraine again threaten the Black Sea Grain Initiative. June 2023. <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/increased-tensions-ukraine-again-threaten-black-sea-grain-initiative>

IMF. 2023. Review of Experience with The Food Shock Window Under The Rapid Financing Instrument and The Rapid Credit Facility. June 2023. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2023/06/30/Review-of-Experience-with-The-Food-Shock-Window-Under-The-Rapid-Financing-Instrument-and-535478>

NASA Harvest Consortium. 2023. Navigating The Kakhovka Dam Collapse: NASA Harvest Consortium Assesses Agriculture Impacts With Satellite Imagery. June 2023. <https://nasaharvest.org/news/navigating-kakhovka-dam-collapse-nasa-harvest-consortium-assesses-agriculture-impacts>

OCHA. 2023. Ukraine – Humanitarian Impact and Response Flash Update #9: Destruction of Kakhovka Dam (27 Jun 2023). June 2023. [https://reliefweb.int/report/](https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-impact-and-response-flash-update-9-destruction-kakhovka-dam-27-jun-2023-enuk)

[ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-impact-and-response-flash-update-9-destruction-kakhovka-dam-27-jun-2023-enuk](https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-impact-and-response-flash-update-9-destruction-kakhovka-dam-27-jun-2023-enuk)

United Nations. 2023. Data – Black Sea Grain Initiative. July 2023. <https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/data>

United Nations. 2023. Black Sea Grain Initiative Negotiations Continue, But Attacks on Civilians Impact Humanitarian Aid, Senior Official Tells Security Council. May 2023. <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15281.doc.htm>

UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Ukraine. 2023. Potential Long-Term Impact of the Destruction of the Kakhovka Dam: UNCT Joint Analytical Note. June 2023. <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/potential-long-term-impact-destruction-kakhovka-dam-unct-joint-analytical-note-9-june-2023>

United Nations. 2023. Secretary-General's press encounter on the Black Sea Initiative. July 2023. <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2023-07-17/secretary-generals-press-encounter-the-black-sea-initiative>

United States Department of Agriculture. 2023. International Agricultural Trade Report: Russia Grain and Oilseed Exports Expand. May 2023. <https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/russia-grain-and-oilseed-exports-expand>

Spotlight – El Niño returns amid multiple crises

CGIAR. 2014. Impacts of El Niño southern oscillation on the global yields of major crops. 2014. <https://ccafs.cgiar.org/resources/publications/impacts-el-nino-southern-oscillation-global-yields-major-crops>

FAO. 2014. Understanding the drought impact of El Niño on the global agricultural areas: An assessment using **FAO's Agricultural Stress Index (ASI)**. July 2014. <https://www.fao.org/3/i4251e/i4251e.pdf>

FAO. 2016. 2015-16 El Niño – Early action and response for agriculture, food security and nutrition. May 2016. <https://www.fao.org/3/i5491e/i5491e.pdf>

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. El Niño to return in 2023 following a three-year La Niña phase. April 2023. <https://www.fao.org/3/cc5749en/cc5749en.pdf>

European Commission. 2016. The 2015-2016 El Niño event: expected impact on food security and main response scenarios in East and Southern Africa. January 2016. <https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC98751>

FEWS NET. 2016. Southern Africa Special Report – Illustrating the extent and severity of the 2015-16 drought. March 2016. https://fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/FEWS%20NET_Southern%20Africa%202015_16%20Drought%20Map%20Book_20160318_0.pdf

FEWS NET. 2020. El Niño and Precipitation, Agroclimatology Fact Sheet Series, Vol. 1, pp. 1-2. 2020. https://fews.net/sites/default/files/uploads/2pager_elnino_FINAL0.pdf

FSIN. 2017. Global Report on Food Crises 2017. March 2017. https://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp291271.pdf?_ga=2.220297693.413343914.1689147605-1752951704.1684846800

FSIN. 2018. Global Report on Food Crises 2018. March 2018. https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC_2018_Full_report_EN_Low_resolution.pdf

FSIN. 2019. Global Report on Food Crises 2019. April 2019. https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC_2019-Full_Report.pdf

FSIN. 2020. Global Report on Food Crises 2020. April 2020. <https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC%20ONLINE%20FINAL%202020.pdf>

FSIN. 2021. Global Report on Food Crises 2021. May 2021. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000127343/download/?_ga=2.221991389.413343914.1689147605-1752951704.1684846800

GEOGLAM Crop Monitor. 2023. Report Archive. November 2015. <https://cropmonitor.org/index.php/cmreports/reports-archive/>

IMF. 2015. Fair Weather or Foul? The Macroeconomic Effects of El Niño. April 2015. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Fair-Weather-or-Foul-The-Macroeconomic-Effects-of-El-Ni%C3%B1o-42841>

IMF. 2023. Global Economic Outlook Update: Near-term resilience, persistent challenges. July 2023. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2023/07/10/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2023>

NOAA's National Weather Service. 2016. The 2015-16 El Niño. October 2016. <https://www.nws.noaa.gov/ost/climate/STIP/41CDPW/41cdpw-MLHeureux.pdf>

NOAA. 2019. August 2019 El Niño Update: Stick a fork in it. August 2019. <https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/enso/august-2019-el-ni%C3%B1o-update-stick-fork-it>

NOAA. 2023. June 2023 ENSO Update: El Niño is here. June 2023. <https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/june-2023-enso-update-el-ni%C3%B1o-here>

NOAA. 2023. ENSO Diagnostic Discussion. July 2023. https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/enso_advisory/ensodisc.shtml

Science. 2023. Persistent effect of El Niño on global economic growth. May 2023. <https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adf2983>

UNCCD. 2022. Drought in numbers 2022 – restoration for readiness and resilience. May 2022. [chrome-extension://efaidnbmninnibpcjpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.unccd.int/sites/default/files/2022-05/Drought%20in%20Numbers.pdf](https://www.unccd.int/sites/default/files/2022-05/Drought%20in%20Numbers.pdf)

UNDRR. 2021. GAR Special Report on Drought 2021. June 2021. <https://www.undrr.org/publication/gar-special-report-drought-2021>

WFP. 2023. El Niño Report. August 2023.

WMO. 2023. World Meteorological Organization declares onset of El Niño conditions. July 2023. <https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/world-meteorological-organization-declares-onset-of-el-ni%C3%B1o-conditions>

Chapter 2

Central and Southern Africa

IPC. 2022. République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) Aperçu de la sécurité alimentaire et de la nutrition (Juillet 2022-Juin 2023). October 2022. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_DRC_Food_Security_Nutrition_22Jun23Jul_French.pdf

IPC. 2023. République Démocratique du Congo. Mise à Jour de la Projection Janvier-Juin 2023. May 2023 https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_DRC_AcuteFoodInsec_ProjectionUpdate_Jan_June2023_Report_French.pdf

FEWS NET. 2023. Food security outlook worsens amid removal of subsidies and forecast El Niño. June 2023. <https://fews.net/southern-africa/angola/remotemonitoring-report/june-2023>

FAO. 2023. Crop prospects and food situation (quarterly global report). July 2023. <https://www.fao.org/3/cc6806en/cc6806en.pdf>

IOM. 2023. Mozambique — Mobility Tracking Assessment Report 18. April 2023. <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-mobility-tracking-assessment-report-18-april-2023?close=truehttps://dtm.iom.int/reports/mozambique-mobility-tracking-assessment-report-18-april-2023?close=true>

IOM. 2023. République Centrafricaine — Tableau de bord des déplacements 18 (Mai 2023 — Juin 2023). June 2023.

- <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/republique-centrafricaine-tableau-de-bord-des-deplacements-18-mai-2023-juin-2023?close=true> HYPERLINK „<https://dtm.iom.int/central-african-republic>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Sudan Situation – UNHCR External Update #17-6 July 2023. July 2023. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/101812>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Global Weather Hazards Summary. April 2023. <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2023-05/Weather-Hazards-04142023.pdf><https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2023-05/Weather-Hazards-04142023.pdf>
- FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. United Republic of Tanzania Country Brief. July 2023. <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=TZA&lang=ru>
- IPC.** 2023. Tanzania: Acute Food Insecurity Situation October 2022–February 2023 and March–May 2023. December 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156131?iso3=TZA>
- IPC.** 2023. Zambia: Acute food insecurity analysis July 2022–March 2023. August 2023. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Zambia_Acute_Food_Insecurity_2022July2023Mar_Report.pdf
- FAO.** 2022. Crop prospects and food situation (Quarterly Global Report). December 2022. <https://www.fao.org/3/cc3233en/cc3233en.pdf>
- East Africa**
- IPC.** 2023. Burundi: Acute Food Insecurity Situation. May 2022. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Burundi_AcuteFoodInsecurity_Apr_Sept2023_Report_French.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Djibouti: Acute Food Insecurity Situation January–December 2023. June 2023. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Djibouti_Acute_FoodInsec_Malnutrition_JanDec2023_Report_French.pdf
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Food Assistance Outlook Brief. July 2023. https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2023-07/FAOB_July%202023_Final_0.pdf
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Food Assistance Outlook Brief. June 2023. <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2023-06/FAOB-June-2023-Final.pdf>
- IPC.** 2023. Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Snapshot. March–June 2023 https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Somalia_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_2023JanJun_Snapshot.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Analysis. July 2022–July 2023. November 20 https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_22July_23July_report.pdf
- UNHCR.** 2023. <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/unhcr-operational-update-east-and-horn-africa-and-great-lakes-region-january-march-2023>
- FAO-GIEWS.** 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation. July 2023. <https://www.fao.org/3/cc6806en/cc6806en.pdf>
- ICPAC.** 2023. Seasonal Forecast: June–September 2023 [https://www.icpac.net/seasonal-forecast/Accessed 1 July 2023](https://www.icpac.net/seasonal-forecast/Accessed%201%20July%2023).
- OCHA.** 2023. Impact of Sudan Crisis on South Sudan Flash Update No. 2 June, 2023. <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/impact-sudan-crisis-south-sudan-flash-update-no-2-8th-june-2023>
- OCHA.** 2023. South Sudan: Response for Sudan Crisis Situation Report No. 3 (As of 6th July 2023). <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-response-sudan-crisis-situation-report-no-3-6th-july-2023>
- OCHA.** 2022. Sudan Humanitarian Update, June 2022. Last updated: 5 Sep 2022 [Online] [Accessed on 3 August 2023] <https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/sudan/card/5zvCHJOppG/>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Sudan Situation: Regional Refugee Response Plan Preliminary Summary & Inter-Agency Requirements (May–October 2023) May, 2023. <https://reporting.unhcr.org/files/2023-05/Final%20Sudan%20RRP%20summary%20-%204%20May%202023.pdf>
- ACLEDD.** 2023. Ethiopian Peace Observatory. <https://epo.acleddata.com/>
- Sudan Focus**
- UNHCR.** 2023. Sudan situation (operational data portal). July 2023. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sudansituation>
- FSIN.** 2023. Global Report on Food Crises 2023. May 2023. <https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC2023-hi-res.pdf>
- WHO.** 2023. Levels and trends in child malnutrition: **UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Group** Joint child malnutrition estimates: key findings of the 2023 edition. May 2023. <https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240073791>
- OCHA.** 2023. Sudan: Revised Humanitarian Response Plan 2023 (Revision issued on 17 May 2023). May 2023. https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-revised-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-revision-issued-17-may-2023?_gl=1*1jxvsk9*_ga*NjA1NTA2NTQ4LjE2NzYwMTMyOTA*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*MTY4ODcyMzQ3MS4xOS4wLjE2ODg3MjM0NzEuNjAuMC4w
- USAID.** 2023. Sudan – Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #14, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023. July 2023. <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-14-fiscal-year-fy-2023>
- West Africa**
- CILSS-CH.** March 2023. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l’Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l’analyse de l’insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aigüe courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023. https://agrhyet.cilss.int/doss/tocharg/2023/04/Fiche_com_2023_VF.pdf
- CILSS-CH.** November 2022. Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel, en Afrique de l’Ouest et au Cameroun : Résultats de l’analyse de l’insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aigüe courante en octobre-décembre 2022 et projetée en juin-août 2023. https://agrhyet.cilss.int/doss/tocharg/2023/01/Resultats_Analyses_Nov2022_fichedecommunication.pdf
- CILSS, FSIN et GNAFC.** June 2023. Rapport régional pour le Sahel et l’Afrique de l’Ouest 2023. Niamey et Rome. <https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/CILSS%20RRFC%202023.pdf>
- UNHCR.** 2023. Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa: Forcibly Displaced and Stateless Population as of 31 January 2023. January 2023. Document – UNHCR RBWCA – Monthly Statistics – January 2023
- UNHCR.** 2023. Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa: Forcibly Displaced and Stateless Population And Trends From 2018-2023. June 2023. Document – UNHCR RBWCA – Monthly Statistics – June 2023
- WFP.** 2023. WFP DataViz – Inflation [Online] [Accessed on 2 August 2023] Economic: Macro-Economics: Inflation – Dataviz | WFP – VAM
- FAO.** 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin 6. July 2023. Monthly Report on Food Price Trends. <https://www.fao.org/3/cc6909en/cc6909en.pdf>
- FEWS NET.** 2023. Global Price Watch May 2023 Prices. June 2023. <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2023-07/Global-PW-202306-Final.pdf>
- CILSS.** 2023. Rapport Régional sur la Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle au Sahel et en Afrique de l’Ouest (RRSAN). June 2023. <https://agrhyet.cilss.int/doss/tocharg/2023/06/Rapport-RSAN-2023.pdf>
- Asia**
- ACAPS.** 2023. Afghanistan: Risk Overview. June 2023. <https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/archives/detail/afghanistan-risk-overview-1>
- IPC.** 2023. Bangladesh: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis. June 2023. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Bangladesh_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar_Sep2023_Report.pdf
- IPC.** 2023. Pakistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot [Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa & Sindh] April 2023–January 2024. June 2023. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/1_IPC_Pakistan_AcuteFoodInsecurity_April%202023_January%202024_snapshot_English.pdf
- IPC.** 2022. Pakistan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation July–August 2022 and Projection for September–December 2022. December 2022. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156103?iso3=PAK>
- WFP and FAO.** 2023. Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) to the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. May 2023. <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000149636/download/>
- OCHA.** 2023. Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview. January 2023. https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-needs-overview-2023-january-2023?gclid=Cj0KCQjw8NiBhDOARIsAHZpbLAGiMC4A67AN5qcl6AHJMd3owfuFjBzSjzjQAbpQbaewWWWdHVMaAmk-EALw_wcB
- IPC.** 2023. Bangladesh: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for March–April 2023 and Projection for May–September 2023. June 2023. <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156384?iso3=BGD>
- CARE.** 2022. The Impact of the Food Crisis on Women and Girls in Afghanistan. November 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/impact-food-crisis-women-and-girls-afghanistan-november-2022>
- World Bank.** 2023. Sri Lanka Development Update 2023. April 2023. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/srilanka/publication/sri-lanka-development-update-2023>
- UNDP.** 2023. Afghanistan Socio-Economic Outlook 2023. April 2023. <https://www.undp.org/afghanistan/publications/afghanistan-socio-economic-outlook-2023>
- United Nations – Bangladesh. 2023. As Cyclone Mocha damages Rohingya refugee camps, aid and support is urgently needed. May 2023. <https://bangladesh.un.org/en/231600-cyclone-mocha-damages-rohingya-refugee-camps-aid-and-support-urgently-needed>

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. The current critical food security situation could deteriorate in the second half of 2022. July 2023 <https://www.fao.org/3/cc7195en/cc7195en.pdf>

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. Afghanistan Country Brief. June 2023. <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=AFG&lang=en>

IOM. 2023. Joint Response Plan: Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (January–December 2023). March 2023. <https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/2023-joint-response-plan-rohingya-humanitarian-crisis-january-december-2023>

United Nations. 2023. As Cyclone Mocha damages Rohingya refugee camps, aid and support is urgently needed (press release). May 2023. <https://bangladesh.un.org/en/231600-cyclone-mocha-damages-rohingya-refugee-camps-aid-and-support-urgently-needed>

Latin America and the Caribbean

IPC. 2023. Guatemala: Análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda de la CIF Marzo 2023-Febrero 2023. June 2023. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Guatemala_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar2023Feb2024_Report_Spanish.pdf

IPC. 2023. Honduras: Análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda de la CIF Diciembre 2022-Agosto 2023. May 2023. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Honduras_AcuteFoodInsecurity_Dec2022Aug2023_Report_Spanish.pdf

IPC. 2023. Haiti: Analyse ipc de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë Mars-Juin 2023. March 2023. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_AcuteFoodInsec_ProjectionUpdate_Mar_June2023_Report_French.pdf

IPC. 2023. Republica Dominicana: Análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda de la CIF Octubre 2022-Junio 2023. January 2023. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_DominicanRepublic_AcuteFoodInsecurity_Oct2022June2023_Report_Spanish.pdf

EC. 2023. Anomaly Hotspots of Agricultural Production: Copernicus C3S Multimodel seasonal rainfall forecast maps. July 2023. https://mars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/asap/seasonal_forecast.php?sfreg=north_america

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation. July 2023. <https://www.fao.org/3/cc6806en/cc6806en.pdf>

Middle East and North Africa

IPC. 2023. Yemen: Acute Malnutrition Situation October 2022–May 2023 and Projected June –September 2023 (partial analysis). June 2023. ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Yemen_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_JanDec2023_Report_English.pdf

WFP. 2023. Food Security in Numbers: Refugees in Jordan, Q1, July 2023. <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/food-security-numbers-refugees-jordan-q1-2023>

ACAPS. 2023. Yemen Social impact monitoring project report: January–March 2023. June 2023. https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230620_ACAPS_Thematic_report_Yemen_social_impact_monitoring_project_report_January-March_2023.pdf

World Bank. 2023. Altered Destinies: The Long-Term Effects of Rising Prices and Food Insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/middle-east-and-north-africa-economic-update>

World Bank. 2023. The Normalization of Crisis is no Road for Stabilization. Spring 2023. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099027005152320346/pdf/IDU0ea0213ae0e0f804ba309c7a00638cf710a36.pdf>

ACAPS. 2023. Yemen: Social Impact Overview. May 2023. https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230505_acaps_thematic_report_yemen_social_impact_overview_2022.pdf

IOM. 2023. Earthquakes Displacement Overview – Türkiye. March 2023. <https://reliefweb.int/report/turkiye/iom-2023-earthquakes-displacement-overview-turkiye-march-2023>

FAO. 2023. Syrian Arab Republic: Post-earthquake rapid needs assessment on agricultural livelihoods and production in the northwest <https://www.fao.org/3/cc5764en/cc5764en.pdf>

FEWS NET. 2023. Food Assistance Outlook Brief. July 2023. https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2023-07/FAOB_July%202023_Final_0.pdf

FEWS NET. 2023. Food Assistance Outlook Brief. June 2023. <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2023-06/FAOB-June-2023-Final.pdf>

FAO-GIEWS. 2023. Crop Prospects and Food Situation. July 2023. <https://www.fao.org/3/cc6806en/cc6806en.pdf>



Global Network
Against Food Crises


Founded by the European Union, FAO and WFP in 2016, the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) is an alliance of humanitarian and development actors committed to addressing the root causes of food crises and finding lasting solutions to them, through shared analysis and knowledge, strengthened coordination in evidence-based responses and collective efforts across the humanitarian, development and peace (HDP) nexus.

www.fightfoodcrises.net  [@fightfoodcrises](https://twitter.com/fightfoodcrises)



Food Security Information Network
Joint analysis for better decisions

Based on a partnership between FAO, FEWS NET, IFPRI, IPC, JRC and WFP the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) facilitates the exchange of technical expertise, knowledge and best practice. Its purpose is to promote timely, independent and consensus-based information about food crises, while also highlighting and addressing critical data gaps. As a key partner of the GNAFC, FSIN coordinates the publication of the *Global Report on Food Crises*.

www.fsinplatform.org  [@FSIN_News](https://twitter.com/FSIN_News)